


المرجع	IOR/R/15/1/468
العنوان	"الملف D 140 45/23) I) الإصلاحات في الكويت"
التاريخ/ التواريخ	٠٤ أبريل ١٩٣٨-١٩ سبتمبر ١٩٣٨ (ميلادي)
لغة الكتابة	الإنجليزية و العربية في اللاتينية بالأحرف والعربية
الحجم والشكل	مجلد واحد (٢٢٢ ورقة)
المؤسسة المالكة	المكتبة البريطانية: أوراق خاصة وسجلات من مكتب الهند
حق النشر	المُلكية العامة

حول هذا السجلّ

يتضمن المجلد مراسلات متعلقة بتشكيل المجلس التشريعي عقب الاضطرابات التي شهدتها الكويت والانتقادات التي وُجهت لحكومتها في الصحافة العراقية. ويتضمن كذلك مقالات صحفية، وقائمة بأسماء المنتخبين في المجلس التشريعي في الكويت (الورقة ٧٥) وقائمة بالمطالب التي تقدم بها المجلس (الورقة ٧٦). تتضمن الأطراف الرئيسية للمراسلات كلاً من: جيرالد دو غوري، الوكيل السياسي في الكويت؛ ترنشارد فاول، المقيم السياسي في بوشهر؛ لورانس دوندس، وزير الدولة لشؤون الهند؛ وزارة الخارجية في لندن؛ موريس بيترسون، السفير البريطاني في العراق؛وقائد القوات الجوية البريطانية في العراق؛ الشيخ أحمد الجابر الصباح، حاكم الكويت؛ وبعض المسؤولين الآخرين في الحكومة في الهند.

تتضمن المراسلة:

- مناقشات حول تنحي الشيخ أحمد حاكم الكويت؛

- مراجعة لإدارة الخدمات القضائية والتعليمية والطبية والبلديات والأراضي الصحراوية والسيطرة عليها (الأوراق ٨٣-٩٩)؛

- تعيين ضابط جمارك بريطاني في الكويت؛

- اعتراض سكان الكويت من الفرس على المجلس التشريعي.

يوجد ملاحظات المكتب الداخلي في نهاية المجلد (الأوراق ٢٠٧-٢١٤)، كتبها مسؤولو المقيمية السياسية البريطانية في بوشهر.



R/15/1/468

1

D. 140.

CONFIDENTIAL

45/23-i

KUWAIT REFORMS

P.V. K.40.

CONTD. ON D.145.

FROM ... 1.4.38.

TO .... 15.9.38.



File 45/23-i - Vol.D.140 10

Subject: Kuwait Press and Reforms.



45/23

1D

GOVERNMENT OF INDIA.

_______ DEPARTMENT.

Bahrain 10/4/38.

EXPRESS LETTER

[N. B.—This is an ORIGINAL MESSAGE, sent by post to save telegraphic expense and undue use of the wires, but intended to be treated, on receipt, with the same expedition as if it had been telegraphed. To save time and formalities it is worded and signed as if it had been so despatched.]

FROM The Political Agent, Kuwait.

To The Officiating Political Resident at Bahrein.

(1)

No. C/150 *Dated* 4th April *193*8.

Subject:- Kuwait Situation.

45/16 P.155 Following reports in which the last letter was No. C/149 of 22nd March 1938 from the Hon'ble the Political Resident to the Secretary of State for India, London.

A brief article has appeared in the Basra newspaper as Sajil of the 1st April signed "Kuweiti" entitled "What the Kuwaitis ask of His Highness the Emir of Kuwait."

2. There are six requests, as follows:-

(a) Extension of technical education facilities.

(b) Economic and financial reforms.

(c) A free state hospital.

(d) Closing of employment to refugees.

(e) Permission for Arabs to visit Kuwait without hindrance.

(f) The Emir to take a greater interest in his people and personally settle their cases.

Note:-

(d) is presumably a tilt at the employment by the Sheikh of a Syro-Egyptian Secretary, and Iraqis and Egyptian.(See my Express letter No.C-244 of 30th October, 1937). 53/92 P.37



2

-2-

(e) Perhaps refers to the fact that four Palestinians without travel papers were recently refused permission by me to visit Kuwait.

(f) Refers to the fact that the Sheikh leaves justice, and the administration of the town to Sheikh Abdulla Jabir.

[signature] Captain,

Political Agent, Kuwait.

Copy sent under P.L. No. C/238, d. 11/4/38, to I.O. and Govt: of I.
[initials] 11/4.



45/23 3

Telegram	Q.
From	H.M's Secretary of State for India, London.
To	Political Resident, Bushire, at Bahrain.
Repeated to	Political Agent, Kuwait.
Copy by post	Secretary to the Government of India, External Affairs Department, New Delhi.

No.743

Dated and received 15th April 1938.

File 41/16 III
p. 155

(2)

Your Express Letter No.C/149 of March 22nd. Agitation at Kuwait.

Please telegraph (a) whether any articles regarding incident have appeared in Iraqi Press and (b) what is the present situation locally.

Secretary of State
for India.

16/4



46/23

4.

Telegram Q.

From Political Resident, Bushire, at Bahrain.

To Political Agent, Kuwait.

No.T/102

Dated 16th April 1938.

P.3

India Office telegram No.743 of 15th April.

Please telegraph report on (a) situation and (b) any articles other than that reported in your Express Letter No.C/150 of 4th April. P.1.

Resident.



5

45/23

Telegram Q.

From Political Agent, Kuwait.

To Political Resident, Bushire, at Bahrain.

No.163

Dated and received 18th April 1938.

(3)

p.3

Reference India Office telegram No. 743 of 15th April. Agitation at Kuwait.

(a) Another article calling for reforms but with additions probably by Iraqi politicians (for example offensive-defensive alliance with Iraq) was published in Baghdad April 11th. Copy is in mail.

(b) situation outwardly quite restored.

(c) no articles have specifically mentioned treatment of agitator BARRAK who is alive in prison. There is indication that Shaikh has been at last impressed and may later make improvements.

Political

Re 45/16 - III p.147



45/23

6

Telegram Q.

From Political Resident, Bushire, at Bahrain.

To H.M's Secretary of State for India,
London.

Copy by air mail Secretary to the Government of India,
External Affairs Department, New Delhi.

Political Agent, Kuwait.

No.T/103

Dated 18th April 1938.

Your telegram No. 743 of 15th April.

Agitation at Kuwait.

2. (a) One article has been reported in my Printed Letter No.C/238 of April 11th. Second article in Baghdad paper calls for additional reforms and for offensive-defensive alliance with Iraq.

(b) Political Agent reports that situation is outwardly fully restored.

3. Political Agent sees indications that Shaikh has at last been impressed and may later make improvements.

Resident.

Copy sent to Govt. of India and P.A.Kuwait
under P.L.No.C/252, dated 18th April 1938

18/4



CONFIDENTIAL. 45/23

No. C-162

BUSHIRE RESIDENCY.
No. Bahrain
Date 19/4/38
CONFIDENTIAL RECORDS.

7

The Political Agent at Kuwait presents his compliments to

The Officiating Political Resident
in the Persian Gulf,
Bahrain.

and has the honour to transmit to him a copy of the undermentioned document(s).
The translator thinks that paras 6, 7, 8 and 9 are inserted by an Iraqi, and that the remainder were the original contribution by a Kuwaiti.

(4)

POLITICAL AGENCY,
KUWAIT.

Dated the 14th April 1938.

Reference to previous correspondence:

DESCRIPTION OF ENCLOSURE.

Name and Date.	Subject.
Translation of an article published in an Iraqi newspaper "al-Zaman" dated Baghdad, 11th April 1938.	

POLITICAL AGENCY KUWAIT



8

Translation of an article appeared in an Iraqi newspaper "al-Zaman" dated, Baghdad 11th April 1938.

KUWAIT AND THE DEMANDS FOR THE IMPROVEMENT OF THEIR COUNTRY.

We, in a previous issue, published the demands of the Kuwaitis, which they submitted to His Highness the Emir of Kuwait for the improvement of their country from the economical, civilized, and educational point of view.

The "al-Nas" newspaper of Basra added some other demands made by Kuwaitis of His Highness the Emir, and which we publish below:-

1. The establishment of two Courts, one Legal and the other an Appeal Court, in which the Laws and Rules are to be complete, and restraint put upon those who punish the nationals and execute judgements as they wish upon them. The election of two other members in each Court, and proper Registers should be kept, to which a reference could be made when necessary.

Judgements, before execution, should be subjected to examination in such a way that no injustice being done.

2. The establishment of a "Security Department" like the Police stations in Iraq, and its members to be distinguished by special badges, and responsible for general supervision and town security work.

3. The proper administration of the Customs revenues. A committee should be appointed to



9

-2-

appointed to supervise the work of the sub-offices The present 'loose' administration should be stopped. The appointment of a Minister or Director General of Finance to supervise all transactions.

4. The establishment of a Committee of Counsellors (Majlis Shura), to which all the affairs of the country should be referred, as also the International affairs which directly affect the interests of the country, and an office to be established for the exclusive work of the Committee.

5. The establishment of a Passport and Residence Office which is to be in close touch with the "Security Department", and the authority for issuing the visas by the British Consul at Basra should be removed. The refusal by the British Consulate of Basra for issuing visas to the Arabs men (Notable Arabs) brings a bad fame upon Kuwait, while Kuwait does not acknowledge any foreign interference in her internal or external affairs.

6. The assistance in financial and educational matters, is to be sought from the Iraq Government, and to follow the steps in parallel line with the Arabs' "Rise" in respect of the customs and laws.

7. Negotiations are to be taken up with the neighbouring Arab Governments for conclusion of Treaties of Alliance - Offensive - defensive, which would possibly reveal any foreign Government's intentions who want the troubles to befall Kuwait.



10

-3-

8. The confinement of work and employments to the Kuwaitis, who when not capable, and Iraqi Arabs to be preferred to the Indians, Armenians and other foreigners.

9. The allotment of a sum in the Budget for despatching the missions abroad to study the mechanic and other courses to be prepared for work in the Oil Department.

10. The Kuwaitis to be acquainted with all the big projects.

Copy sent to I.O. and G. of I. under P.L. No. C/265, d. 21/4/38.
Copy of this P.L. to P.A. Kuwait.

[illegible]
21/4



CONFIDENTIAL.

No. C-164

45/...

BUSHIRE RESIDENCY.
No. Bahrain
Date 23/4/38
CONFIDENTIAL RECORDS

11

The Political Agent at Kuwait presents his compliments to

The Officiating Political Resident
in the Persian Gulf,
Bahrain.

and has the honour to transmit to him a copy of the undermentioned document(s).
with the remark that His Highness has issued a denial of the truth of the messages reported.

(5)

POLITICAL AGENCY,
KUWAIT.

Dated the 19th April 1938.


Reference to previous correspondence:

DESCRIPTION OF ENCLOSURE.

Name and Date.	Subject.
Copy of an article published in the Iraq "Times" of Baghdad dated, 14th April 1938.	

POLITICAL AGENCY KUWAIT

MC/268



A copy of an article published in the Iraq "Times", dated Baghdad, 14th April 1938.

Messages from Basrah state that the Amir of Kuwait, H.H. Amir Ahmad as-Sabah, intends to pay a visit to Baghdad in the middle of May. It is stated that the Amir will request the Iraq Government to co-operate in the introduction of administrative reforms in Kuwait, in departments such as finance and education. It is understood that the Amir will try to engage a number of Iraqi teachers for service in Kuwait.

Copy sent to I.O., G. of I. and Baghdad under P.L. No. C/268 of 23/4/38.
Copy of P.L. to P.A. Kuwait.

[signature] 23/4



CONFIDENTIAL. 45/23. 13

No.C/268.

The Hon'ble the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf presents his compliments to

1. His Majesty's Secretary of State for India, London.
2. The Secretary to the Government of India, External Affairs Department, Simla.
3. His Majesty's Ambassador, Baghdad.

and has the honour to transmit to him a copy of the undermentioned document (s).

The Political Agent, Kuwait reports that His Highness the Shaikh has issued a denial of the statements in the Article.

O/C.

Office of the Political Resident
in the Persian Gulf,
at Bahrain.
~~British Consulate-General,~~
~~BUSHIRE.~~

23.4.38.


Dated 23rd April 1938.

Reference to previous correspondence: 10

Residency Printed Letter No.C/265, dated 21st April 1938.

Description of Enclosure.

Name and Date.	Subject.
Copy of an article published in the Iraq "Times" of Baghdad dated 14th April 1938.	Kuwait Press.



15

2.

Vol K-40 p 151

to maintain law and order in his State, but they consider the treatment meted out to Al Baruk is quite unnecessarily severe. (See paragraph 1 of Captain de Gaury's letter No. C.131 of 19th March). Flogging in itself, within certain humane limits, is a punishment recognised by many Governments, but repeated floggings to obtain information such as were inflicted on Al Baruk is nothing short of torture. As a method of administration it is not practised by modern Rulers and such methods must not be employed again.

(c) Apart from the treatment of Al Baruk, His Majesty's Government have learnt with some anxiety of the events which led up to his arrest and which took the form of a popular movement against His Highness's administration. His Majesty's Government have no desire to give an opinion on the rights and wrongs of this movement, but that it indicated a definite and general discontent with His Highness's rule is evident, and as His Highness will, of course, realise it is the business of the a Ruler to conduct his administration in such a way that general discontent does not arise. His Highness will appreciate that since in these days popular and democratic movements exist in most countries all over the world, it is not surprising that one should now be starting at Koweit. Experience has

shown/

16

3.

shown that the best way to deal with such movements is not mere repression which cannot be continued indefinitely as the movement gets stronger, but the maintenance of law and order combined with a sympathetic guidance of the movement into useful channels of activity. His Majesty's Government feel that the risk of a repetition of the present unfortunate incident would be considerably lessened if His Highness would associate himself more both with his family and his people in his administration, and in giving this advice His Majesty's Government take into account that the normal practice of government amongst Arab peoples from time immemorial is for the latter to be associated in some form or other with their Sheikh in the affairs of the State. His Majesty's Government would be glad to have the views of His Highness as to this suggestion.

(d) Finally His Majesty's Government have in mind the desirability of appointing an Adviser to His Highness and though they do not intend suggesting this officially to His Highness for the moment, they would be glad to have his views unofficially on this measure.

Paragraph 5. I think the above ~~suggestion~~ sermon should be salutary and I would be grateful to know as soon as possible if it is approved. (d) conveys a veiled warning that if the Sheikh does not mend his administration we may have to mend it for him and this should, I think, have a good effect.

T.C. Fowle
25th April 1938

Copy sent under P.L. No. 237-S, 12/5/38, to P.A. Kuwait.



45/23

17

Confidential

The Residency,

Bushire, the 12th May 1938.

D.O.No.234-S

O/C

Could you please refer to my Note of 25th April, — P.14 a copy of which I have with me, on the subject of a verbal approach to the Shaikh of Kuwait with reference to the recent troubles there.

2. I would be grateful for early instructions as to whether this approach can be made. If I cannot get to Kuwait myself I will instruct de Gaury to approach the Shaikh on my behalf.

3. Re paragraph 5 of my note — P.16 "I think the above suggestion". The word "suggestion" should be "sermon".

4. Could I have copies, with copies to de Gaury, of my Note of 14th and Symon's of 21st April referred to in the first line of my Note under reference.

I am sending copies of this* letter to Metcalfe and de Gaury, and a copy of my Note — P.17 of 25th April to the latter.

O/C. Sd. T.C.F.

J.P. Gibson, Esquire,

The India Office,

London.

* sent under P.L.No.237-S of 12/5/38.

EG 12/5.

18

No. 128/4/38.

45/23

HIS Majesty's Ambassador at Bagdad presents his compliments to The Honourable the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf at Bushire, and has the honour to transmit to him the under-mentioned documents.

British Embassy,

16/5

Bagdad,

28th April 1938.

(6)

Reference to previous correspondence :

Description of Enclosure.

Name and Date.	Subject.
[De]spatch No. 188 of the 28th [Apr]il, 1938, to the Foreign [Off]ice, London.	Reform movement in Koweit.

(Copy sent to Q.G.? under P.L. No. 253-S d. 17.5.38)

17/5

3479 13804 (2)



19

No. 188.
(193/4/38).

British Embassy,
Bagdad.
28th April, 1938.

My Lord,

With reference to Your Lordship's despatch No. 196 (E 1832/1642/91) of April 7th, I have the honour to report that the reform movement in Koweit has attracted some notice in Iraq. The unpleasant details set out in the express letter of the Political Agent at Koweit No. C/129 of March 19th have not yet found their way into the newspapers, but paragraphs and articles commenting on the desire of the younger generation in Koweit for a more enlightened administration are frequently published.

2. I enclose, as an example, a summary of an article which appeared in 'Al Istiqlal' of April 26th.

3. I am sending copies of this despatch to the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf and to the Political Agent at Koweit.

I have the honour to be with the highest respect,
My Lord,
Your Lordship's most obedient,
humble Servant,

(Sgd.) Maurice Peterson.

The Right Honourable
The Viscount Halifax,
K.G., G.C.S.I., G.C.I.E.,
etc., etc., etc.



20

ENCLOSURE IN BAGDAD DESPATCH
No. 188 OF 28.4.1938.

EXTRACT FROM LOCAL PRESS
Tuesday, 26th April, 1938.

Al Istiqlal.

The Movement in Koweit.
Iraq's Sympathy.

"It pains Iraq to behold on her borders an Arab territory with an excellent geographical position and yet in a backward state, deprived of means of education and of health and economic organisation. Iraq, who is unable to conceal her strong feelings, is anxious that the sister people of Koweit should join in the general awakening movement which has taken place in the majority of Arab countries, in order that they may, through their national gifts and the favourable position of their country, participate in the wide field of Arab national endeavour. Any existing obstructions and obstacles can be overcome by persistent endeavour. Work towards this end will strengthen confidence in the ultimate success of the attempts at reform now being made by the youth of Koweit......

"The new movement in Koweit gives pleasure and gratification to every Arab, because it will yield results most beneficial to the inhabitants of Koweit themselves. Perhaps they realise the happy future awaiting them if the present movement is maintained and is directed towards co-operation with Iraq with whom certain Arab countries are desirous of union. Such an idea has often been in the minds of the youth of Koweit and has been received with approbation and support in Arab quarters. Iraq is in a position to turn the backward principality of Koweit into a

prosperous



21.

- 2 -

prosperous progressive and civilised country. Having regard to its geographical and commercial position Koweit, if annexed to Iraq, would become a junction of international communications and an excellent port. We leave it to the people of Koweit themselves to appreciate this fact. At the same time we are entitled to sympathise with the (present) movement in Koweit, and will be glad to see it yield the desired results and attain the objects sought. The demands presented (by the inhabitants of Koweit to their ruler) are sound and legitimate, and it is hoped that they will be met with broad-mindedness and with a sincere desire for reform and re-construction."



22

45/23

Telegram Q

From Secretary of State for India, London.

To Political Resident, Bushire.

Repeated Government of India, External Affairs Department, Simla.

Political Agent, Kuwait.

No.986.

Dated and received 24th May 1938.

(7)

K.40/155

Please refer to your Express Letter No.C/149 of 22nd March and connected correspondence regarding recent disturbances at Kuwait.

2. His Majesty's Government agree that oral represntations should be made to Shaikh on lines suggested in your note of 25th April (copy sent to India and Kuwait by mail of 14th May) and subject to views of Government of India you are authorised to proceed accordingly.

P.14.

3. Please let me have in due course a comprehensive review of the state of administration in Kuwait including a report on grievances alleged against the Shaikh.

RETAXANDUM

C.V.A.



45/23

23

Confidential.

No.287-S of 1938.

British Residency and Consulate-General,

Bushire, the 25th May 1938.

To

The Political Agent,

Kuwait.

o/c

Subject: Recent disturbances in Kuwait.

Memorandum.

P.22.

Reference paragraph 3 of India Office telegram No. 986 of 24th May 1938.

2. Please let me have review as soon as possible.

sd/- T.C.Fowle,

Political Resident in the Persian Gulf.

o/c

ATTESTED.

25.5.38

for Secretary to the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf.



45/23

24

Telegram Q

From Secretary to the Government of India, External Affairs Department, Simla.

To Political Resident, Bushire.

Repeated His Majesty's Secretary of State for India, London.

No.869.

Dated the 26th and received the 27th May 1938.

(8)

p.22

Reference Secretary of State's telegram No.986 of the 24th May. Agitation in Kuwait.

2. Government of India concur in action proposed in paragraph 2.

GOVERNMENT OF INDAI.

27.5.'38.

/sc



45/23

25

Confidential.

GOVERNMENT OF INDIA,

________________DEPARTMENT,

EXPRESS LETTER

[N. B.—This is an ORIGINAL MESSAGE, sent by post to save telegraphic expense and undue use of the wires, but intended to be treated, on receipt, with the same expedition as if it had been telegraphed. To save time and formalities it is worded and signed as if it had been so despatched.]

FROM - Political Resident,
Bushire.

To - Political Agent,
Kuwait.

No. 297-S. Dated 27th May 1938.

Subject: Agitation in Kuwait.

Reference correspondence ending with Government of India telegram No.869, dated 26th May 1938, copy of which I enclose. — P.24.

2. Please take necessary action and report Shaikh's reaction.

Sd. T.C. Fowle,
Political Resident in the Persian Gulf.

ATTESTED

28/5

for Secretary to the Political
Resident in the Persian Gulf.

MFP—785S&P—(M-1014)—18-8-33—2,00 000.



45/9-3

CONFIDENTIAL.

No. C-190

26

The Political Agent at Kuwait presents his compliments to

3075

The Hon'ble the Political Resident in the
Persian Gulf, Bushire.

(9)

and has the honour to transmit to him a copy of the undermentioned document(s).

POLITICAL AGENCY,
KUWAIT.

Dated the 23rd May 1938.

Reference to previous correspondence:

DESCRIPTION OF ENCLOSURE.

Name and Date.	Subject.
Translations of articles in Iraqi	newspapers.

[signature]

(4 scs)



NEWSPAPER TRANSLATIONS.

27

AN NAHAR (PAN ARAB AND PRO GOVT.)

28.3.1938.

ALLIANCE OF THE ARAB GULF PRINCIPALITIES.

The paper emphasises the importance of the alliance of "ARAB-GULF" principalities and its effect on the future Arab unity, provided this was free from foreign interference which would certainly corrupt it and direct it into channels other than those for it was originally intended. The rulers of the Gulf provinces are too wise to overlook this fact and to connive the snares laid out for them by the foreigners. They must therefore see that this alliance is solely made for the good and interest of the Arabs themselves with the greater Arab Unity as the final goal.

4.4.1938.

KUWAIT OIL COMPANY REFUSES TO EMPLOY 'IRAQIS.

It is learned that the Kuwait Oil Company has refused to employ 'Iraqis, and those of them that are now in their service will soon be dismissed, next week.

A BRITISH FLEET IN THE PERSIAN GULF.

It is understood that a British Fleet has anchored in the Persian Gulf and that its units were distributed on various coastal points of the Gulf, Bahrain has been adopted as a British Naval base and has been supplied with all war materials an Aircraft carrier is expected to reach the gulf shortly. No one knows the object of this naval visit.

15.4.38

EXTENSION OF RAILWAY LINE TO KUWAIT.

It is learned that the Shaikh of Kuwait has now agreed to the extension of the railway line from Basra to Kuwait.

It is also reported that negotiations between the Arab states in the Gulf and on coasts of the Red Sea have started. Letters for the commencement of these negotiations



28

negotiations
were exchanged as a prelude to the holding of a meeting between the representatives of these states about the end of September. The Amirs of these states will sign the agreements that will be concluded which will be regarded as supplements to the Arab treaty of Alliance.

EXPECTED VISIT OF KING IBN SA'UD.

News from Sa'udi Arabia states that King Ibn Sa'ud intends to visit 'Iraq officially. No date is mentioned for this visit.



NEWSPAPER TRANSLATIONS.

29

AZ ZAMAN (PRO GOVT.)

3.4.1938.

A NEW MOVEMENT IN KUWAIT.

The people of Kuwait have started demanding reforms in their country from their Shaikh, and they have already approached him on the following demands:-

1. The expedience of spreading education in their widest measures so that the people of Kuwait would be given the same opportunities for education as their co-racials in other Arab countries.

2. Establishment of a Hospital at Govt. expense and providing same with all the means necessary in order to save the public from diseases and spare them the need to attend Mission Hospitals which are there for well-known objects.

3. Organisation of the country's economic position and expenditure of its revenues on the improvement of its conditions in every respect.

4. Closing the doors of Kuwait in the face of foreign refugees who have no ties with the natives of the country.

5. Full permission must be given to the Arab nationalists to visit Kuwait and no Arab should be prevented from entering Kuwait under any conditions, and see that steps are taken to remove the misunderstanding that Kuwait is not prepared to accept Arab visitors.

6. The Amir should get in touch with all classes of the people and hear their complaints and conduct the affairs on a basis satisfactory to the majority.

7. The Kuwait people wish that this country should cooperate with 'Iraq for realising reformatory projects and for its improvement on the basis of educatinal and cultural, trade and geographical considerations.

(Copy sent to F.O., G-of-I. + Baghdad under P.L. No. 318-S d. 2.6.38.)



Newspaper Translations.

30

AZ ZAMAN (PRO GOVERNMENT) 3.4.1938.

BANNING OF A MEETING AT KUWAIT?

The following news was received from Kuwait for Publication:-

The principality of Kuwait has prevented the youth of Kuwait from holding a gneral meeting in honour of Fakhri Al-Barudi and his companions who visited it recently for rear lest any speeches were made in the meeting in criticism of the Political conditions. When the Govt. found that the youth were insisting on holding the meeting they arrested some of them, including Muhammad Al-Barrak. Certain prominent persons are now trying to have the prisinors released.

5.4.1938.

A UNITED TRADE AGREEMENT BETWEEN 'IRAQ AND ARAB STATES IN GULF.

Private news from Kuwait indicates that the commercial circles in the coastal Arab states are discussing the advisability of approaching 'Iraq upon the question of the conclusion of a united trade agreement between 'Iraq, Kuwait, Bahrain, Hasa and Quatar on the basis of commercial cooperation between them. Most probably a trade mission will be formed from Kuwait and Bahrain principalities to visit 'Iraq and get in touch with official and private quarters for realizing this great project.

EXPORT OF TOBACCO TO KUWAIT.

The Govt. Gazette published an ordinance yesterday, issued under the Law for the Drawback of Excise Duty paid on tobacco exported from 'Iraq, No. 4 of 1938, in which the excise duty paid on tobacco (for cigarettes and Nargilah) exported from 'Iraq to Kuwait can not be drawn back.

NEW POSTS ON 'IRAQI? KUWAIT AND NEJD FRONTIERS.

The directorate general of Customs has decided to build new Customs Police Posts at Al-Ash'ali, Khidhir al Ma and south of Busayya, while those at Um Qasr and Midfar will be abolished



abolished

and armoured cars are to be sent instead to visit those places from time to time to check smuggling of goods across the frontier.

AN NAS (PAN ARAB AND ANTI BRITISH).

3.4.1938.

KUWAIT PRINCIPALITY AND CAPTAIN DE GAURY.

One of the local papers had mentioned recently that Captain de Gaury, Advisor to Kuwait Principality, had arrived at Basra to represent Kuwait in the opening ceremony of Basra Air-Port. The fact is, however, that Captain de Gaury is the British Poltical Agent in Kuwait and had come for his own private business. The Shaikh of Kuwait has no advisor but rules solely. The paper has also been told that Col. Fowle's journey to London has nothing to do with the alleged establishment of new relations between Kuwait and 'Iraq.



45/23

CONFIDENTIAL.

No. C-194

The Political Agent at Kuwait presents his compliments to 31

The Hon'ble the Political Resident in the
Persian Gulf, Bushire.

(10)

and has the honour to transmit to him a copy of the undermentioned document(s).
With the remark that there is no truth in the statement in the third article about the request by the Company for Iraqi workmen.

POLITICAL AGENCY,
KUWAIT.

Dated the 27th May 1938.

Reference to previous correspondence:

DESCRIPTION OF ENCLOSURE.

Name and Date.	Subject.
Translation of articles from the Baghdad newspaper "Al-Karkh" of 13th May 1938.	

(4 scs)



Translation and extracts from the Baghdad newspaper Al-Karkh of 13th May 1938.

32

TAXES DUE TO GOVT. ON THE ESTATES OF THE AMIR OF KUWAIT. WHY GOVT. DOES NOT DEMAND IT ?

We wrote repeatedly about the taxes, amounting to many thousands of Dinars, which are due to Govt. against the estates of the Amir of Kuwait. These taxes are due from his properties in Basra, from time to time he has been evading payment by giving false promises to pay, while the amount is increasing yearly by thousands of Dinars. It was the duty of previous Govts. not to have allowed the Amir any more opportunities for payment than the many that were a already given to him to settle his debt.

The Amir of Kuwait has no any good intentions towards Iraq and the Iraqis, and we beleive that by evading payment he is trying to gain time for denying this right by means of the passage of time, therefore, we hope that Govt. will not allow him any more time. His estates are situate at Basra and Govt. has only to attach them against recovery of the great amount due, and we think that their value will be insufficeint to meet the amount which has accumolated for many years.

We read from time to time that the Amir of Kuwait does not hesitate in taking any opportunity , which might present itself, to harm the interests of Iraq. Elsewhere (in this issue) there are examples which give support to our assertions, therefore, we see no reason why Govt. should not collect the accumolated taxes from him, which is a clear right of the Treasury.

AN IRAQI MERCHANTS PROPERTIES IN KUWAIT IN WHICH OIL HAS BEEN FOUND, AND GOVT. EFFORTS FOR RECOVERY OF HIS PLAIN RIGHT

The Amir of Kuwait has given concession to a certain Company to prospect for oil, which was found in rich wells all over a large tract of land. The Company took advantage of this, relying on the word of the Amir that the



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the land was his. But, lately it was found that the land belongs to Shaikh Kasim Al-Ibrahim, an important iraqi merchant residing in India for a long time, who has forwarded an appeal to the Govt of India for possession of these lands which belong to him, and he has also sent an appeal to the proper authorities in Iraq, asking for Govt. mediation in the matter. He is intent on filing a suit against the Amir for giving the concession to the Company over lands which do not belong to him, and he will demand a vast compensation. He supports his case by official documents which prove his allegations. When the Amir of Kuwait realised that he would lose this great contract, he asked the Company to approach Shaikh Kasim and offer him compensation, equal to the value of the lands, on condition that he gives up his rights to him. But we understand that Shaikh Kasim is determined to proceed with his case till the end, because his right is clear, and that he wishes to put the land under the control of the Iraq Govt., and that he has engaged famous British and Iraqi lawyers for the purpose. We have also heard from many legal authorities that the rights of the claimant are clear and that it is certain that he will get his rights in full. We also understand that the Iraqi Consulate General at Bombay has asked the Govt at Baghdad to take up the matter in earnest so that the Iraqi's clear rights may not be lost.

THE AMIR OF KUWAIT AND IRAQI WORKERS.

The paper goes on to say that the Amir has forbidden the engagement of any Iraqi workmen in the Kuwait Oil Co. and that the Company cannot do without them, and as he was obstinate they had to put the matter before the Political Agent whose orders the Amir does not hesitate to obey as he is indebted to the British for his existance and position, and he always keeps an autographed picture of His Late Majesty King George V under His Majesty's own signature. The paper expects that anyhow the Amir will come down to real facts and advises him not to go too far



- 3 -

too far
in his actions of harming the interests of Iraq, as he has his own many interests there which may be harmed in return.

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THE BASRA POLICE TO INTENCIFY THEIR EFFORTS TO STOP SMUGGLING. THE AMIR OF KUWAIT'S UNCONCERNED ATTITUDE.

Extract.

The following has been received from our Basra correspondent: -

The Basra Police are taking the necessary measures for the prevention of smuggling, which is usually from Kuwait, by increasing the fronteir guard to watch all along the Kuwait fronteir.

The Amir of Kuwait shows an unconcerned attitude and it is the duty of Govt. to put an end to his unfreindly actions.

By writing these we are not medling in the internal affairs of Kuwait or the affairs of her Amir, but we are writing about the common harm which is being done to our Customs and Revenues, and eventually to our Budget, the cheif source of which is through the Customs. We are well awre that the Amir does not do anything to stop this harm which is being done to us through Kuwait, and this supports the general beleif that he is in full sympathy with smuggling, or that he ignores it.

We shall return to the subject and we, however, hope that the Amir of Kuwait will come to his senses and will realise that such actions are against the rules and good neighbourliness.



45/23 ✓

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INDIA OFFICE,
WHITEHALL, S.W.1.
27th May, 1938.

P.Z.3548/38

(11)

4/6

My dear Fowle,

Would you kindly refer to paragraph 4 of your demi official letter No.234 S of the 12th May regarding the recent troubles at Koweit?

Copies of your note of 14th April were sent to you, India and de Gaury by mail of 14th May, and I now enclose a copy of Symon's note of 21st April.

Copies of this letter (and enclosure) are being sent to India and Koweit.

Yours sincerely

[signature]

The Hon'ble.
Lieutenant Colonel Sir T.C.W. Fowle,
KCIE., CBE.,
H.B.M.'s Consulate-General,
Bushire.

1 s/c.



36.

P.Z.2715/38

Sir T.Fowle (through Mr. Gibson),

The result of our telegraphic enquiry shows -

(a) that two articles have appeared in the Iraqi press;

(b) that the situation locally is outwardly fully restored and

(c) the Political Agent sees indications that the Sheikh has at last been impressed and may later make improvements.

So far so good but we have now to consider what action, if any, should be taken by His Majesty's Government, and it would be useful to have your views on this aspect.

A.C.B. SYMON
21/4.



45/23

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By Air Mail.

P.Z. 2962/1938.

BUSHIRE RESIDENCY.
No. 690
Date 14.6.38
CONFIDENTIAL RECORDS

Jn 14/6

Discuss with P.A. Kt

INDIA OFFICE,

LONDON,

14 MAY 1938

(12)

Forwarded with the compliments of the Secretary, Political Department, India Office.

A copy has been sent to India + Koweit

by Air ~~Sea~~ Mail.

~~The Foreign Secretary, Government of India.~~
The Political Resident in the Persian Gulf.

4963 2000 7.36



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India Office,
Whitehall, S.W.1.
11th May, 1938.

P.Z.2962/38.

CONFIDENTIAL.

Vol K-40
f.155

Dear Baggallay

Would you kindly refer to the Political Resident's express letter of the 22nd March, No.C/149 (copy sent to the Foreign Office under India Office covering letter of the 31st March, No.P.Z.2148/38) and subsequent correspondence relating to the agitation in Koweit against the Sheikh's administration. I attach enclose for your information a copy of two notes, dated 14th and 25th April, which were recorded on the subject by Fowle when in London. In the later note he proposes that oral representations should be made to the Sheikh with the object of warning him against the dangers he is running and of encouraging him to adopt a more liberal attitude in the administration. There is a risk that if we do nothing to remove existing grievances some of the malcontents will look increasingly to Iraq for sympathy and encouragement to the detriment of our position in

f.14

Koweit/

[B]aggallay, Esq.,
[For]eign Office, S.W.1.



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2.

Koweit. We think therefore that representations should be made to the Sheikh and we propose, if the Foreign Office concur, and subject to the views of the Government of India, to authorise Fowle to proceed on the lines he has suggested.

We should be glad to learn your views as soon as possible.

Yours sincerely.

(Sgd.) R. PEEL



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Vol. K. 40
p. 153

Note by Sir Trenchard Fowle, dated
14th April, 1938.

I saw Captain de Gaury on my way through Basra, vide paragraph 4 of my express letter No.C/149 of 22nd March (P.Z.2148), and discussed the matter with him. His views were as expressed in his express letter of 19th March, No.C/129.

2. The seriousness of the situation in my opinion depends partly at any rate on its repercussions in adjoining countries, especially Iraq. In paragraph 4 of his letter No.C/131 Captain de Gaury reported that several persons in panic had left Kuwait for Iraq, and I imagined that the Iraqi Press, which as you know takes every opportunity of attacking Kuwait, would have taken this opportunity of a fresh onslaught. They could have attacked the Shaikh of Kuwait as a brutal and high-handed Dictator suppressing a popular movement, and - what would have affected us - could have represented him being supported, either actively or tacitly, by H.M.G., under whose protection he is. If such articles had appeared they would probably have been copied by the rest of the Arab Press further afield, and the European Press, or rather sections of it, e.g., the Italian, might have taken it up. Before our present détente with Italy the incident would have been welcomed by the Bari Broadcast.

3. I therefore asked Captain de Gaury to telegraph to Mr.Weightman, repeating to India Office and Government of India any repercussions that might ensue in the Iraqi Press. He has not telegraphed and so I assume that, contrary to my expectation, the Iraqi Press has not taken advantage of the incident - why I don't know. Nor has

he/



he reported further on the incident itself, so I assume that all is quiet.

4. I suggest however that a telegram be sent to Mr.Weightman, repeated to Captain de Gaury, copy by air mail to Government of India, referring to my express letter No.149 of 22nd March, and asking (a) whether any articles on the incident have appeared in the Iraqi Press, (b) how does the situation now stand. When we receive a reply we can consider what action, if any, is required by His Majesty's Government.

K.40 / 153



45/23

C-212

Political Agency, 42
Kuwait.
The 13th June, 1938.

17/6

My dear Sir Trenchard,

(13)

Will you please refer to your Express letter No. 297-S of 27th May, 1938. 25

I spoke to the Ruler today as you instructed me to do. Some time has elapsed since my report on the 19th March and His Highness, as I had thought not improbable, now endeavoured to pass off the movement at the time of the al Barrak incident as nothing of importance, saying that there was no popular or democratic movement in Kuwait. My suggestion he said was something new, where had such ideas come from? Such movement as there had been, had arisen from the activities of an Iraqi intriguer, one al Faidhi, who had come down on a boat taking away gravel for the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. This man I had not heard of before, and I said I was surprised he had not mentioned to me his subversive activities.

2. As for al Barrak, the Ruler said, that he was punished as he deserved and that was that.

I said that this would not do. There had been torture, and I repeated firmly what I had said before that there was to be no repetition of this kind of beating to extract information, and day after day. A definite number of strokes awarded as a punishment was a different thing to just "beating up" a prisoner for an indefinite time, which was not to occur again. His Highness had nothing more to say, and only screwed up his face - like a child about to cry.

Lt-Colonel Sir Trenchard Fowle,
K.C.I.E.,C.B.E.,
Political Resident, Persian Gulf,
B U S H I R E.



3. The suggestion that any new democratic movement should be drawn by him into useful channels seemed to be beyond his comprehension, and I believe that it is. A movement of this kind is, in his view, to be suppressed firmly and I doubt if even a lengthy explanation would convince him of the soundness of any other policy. Such understanding as he has acquired of political forms, has, I fear, long ago ranged him on the side of dictators.

I will however, from time to time, endeavour to educate him upon this subject.

4. With regard to a closer cooperation with his family and people in the administration he said he thought his cooperation was quite close enough already, and that no alteration was desirable. As soon as Oil Royalties began to come in he would undertake the various improvements that were needed, such as a hospital and better educational facilities. I had put these two examples into his mouth, as I had asked him what he meant by improvements, was it such things, or did he mean a change in the shape of the administration ?.

5. He was surprisingly unemphatic in his reply about the appointment of an Adviser. It may be that he has been expecting such an appointment, and that the various statements which have appeared in the press from his Secretary's pen, to say that he has no Foreign Advisers, that Colonel Dickson is not his Adviser, and so on, have been merely an attempt to stave off what he has regarded as inevitable.

6. In any case, he had nothing much to say about it, and only asked what the Adviser would advise about. I said the administration of course, and anything on which His Highness might need advice. He only shrugged his shoulders, and said the Government was able to do what it wished.



-3-

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7. His Highness, who, at first, in his usual lively manner endeavoured to brush aside any criticism, had by the end of the interview a quieter and more reasonable air, and was more impressed than might be apparent from his replies.

8. I am submitting, in a later mail, a comprehensive report on the present administration of Kuwait.

Yours sincerely
E.H.Gastrell



4 5/23

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No.C/333 of 1938.

Office of the Political Resident
in the Persian Gulf, s.s.VARSOVA.

The 18th June 1938.

O/C

His Highness
Shaikh Sir Ahmad al Jabir
as Sabah, K.C.I.E., C.S.I.,
Ruler of Kuwait.

My esteemed friend,

Our Friend, Captain de Gaury, informed me of the conversation which he had with Your Highness on the subject of the present administration of Kuwait.

2. The most important part of this conversation was the advice which Captain de Gaury gave to Your Highness on behalf of His Majesty's Government that you might associate yourself more both with your family and with your people in your administration.

3. It seems to me personally that Your Highness might carry this advice into effect by the formation of a Council such as your grandfather, the Great Shaikh Mubarak, used to have. I understand that this Council was formed of some members of the Subah family and some of the heads of the leading families in

Kuwait./

مكتبة رئيس الخليج الفارسي ظهر
مركب ورسوا

رقم ٣٣٣ سري

في ١٨ جون ١٩٣٨
١٩ ربيع الثاني ١٣٥٧

من لفتننت كرنل سر ترنچارد فاولكمبي آي ئي سي بي ئي

رئيس الخليج الفارسي

حميد الشيم
الى حضرة الاكرم الافخم صاحب المعالي سمو الشيخ سر احمد الجابر
الصباح حاكم الكويت المحترم

بعد اهداء التحية والسلام والفحص عن صحة احوال سموكم الحميدة
ان صديقنا قبطان دكوري اخبرني عن محاورته التي جرت مع
سموكم بشأن ادارة حكومة الكويت الحاضرة .

٢ ان قسمة هذه المحاورة التي لها اعظم اهمية هي النصيحة
التي قدم اياها قبطان دكوري عن قبل حكومة جلالة الملك
الى سموكم وهي انه يمكنكم تباشرون الكثر شئون اسرتكم شئون
اهاليكم كلاهما الذين تحت حكومتكم .

٣ ويظهر لي شخصيا انه يمكنكم تنفيذ هذه النصيحة بواسطة
تشكيل ديوان مثل ديوان الذي كان لدى جدكم الشيخ مبارك
الكبير وسمعت ان ذلك الديوان كان متشكلا من بعض اعضاء



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Kuwait.

4. I should be glad to learn in due course through Captain de Gaury your views on this subject.

I desire to express the high consideration which I entertain for Your Excellency, and to subscribe myself

Your Highness' sincere friend,

Sd/- T

Political Resident in the Persian Gulf.

اسرة الشيخ وبعض رؤسا اعيان الكويت

م ويسرني ان اسمع بواسطة [بوقته] قبطان دگوري

عن رأيكم فى هذا الموضوع

هذا وفى الختام اقدم لسموكم فائق الاحترام

القاة

[illegible]

رئيس الخليج الفارسي

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15/6



CONFIDENTIAL

GOVERNMENT OF INDIA.

Department.

47

EXPRESS LETTER (AIR MAIL).

[N.B.—*This is an ORIGINAL message sent by AIR MAIL which provides a means of communication more expeditious than the ordinary mail and is cheaper than the telegraph. It is intended to be treated, on receipt, with the same expedition as if it had been telegraphed. To save time and to obviate formalities it is drafted in the form of a telegram. It is authenticated by the signature of a responsible officer of the Department.*]

Office of the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, s.s.VARSOVA.

No. C/334 *Dated* ~~xxxxx~~ *the* 18th June 1938.

O/C.

~~To~~

From - Political Resident, Bushire, on s.s.VARSOVA.

To - His Majesty's Secretary of State for India, London.

Repeated The Secretary to the Government of India, External Affairs Department, Simla.

~~Reference~~ Political Agent, Kuwait.

Subject: Agitation in Kuwait.

Reference correspondence ending with Government of India telegram No.869, dated 26th May 1938.

2. I enclose herewith a copy of a letter No.C/212 of 13th June 1938 from the Political Agent, Kuwait. The Express Letter referred to by de Gaury was merely asking him to take action on the above quoted telegram.

3. As you will see from de Gaury's letter the Shaikh's first reaction to the expression of His Majesty's Government's views was not particularly favourable, but de Gaury informs me that in a later interview which he had with the Shaikh the latter was considerably chastened.

4. I do not think that we can let the matter rest there and I enclose a copy of a letter which I have addressed to His Highness suggesting that he should form a Council.

(Signature) AS/

(Designation)

S. 44.

MFP—985 S&P—(M-1597)—27-11-36—10,000.



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As you will see, the letter is worded in such a way as to convey that my advice is merely a suggestion, and that it comes personally from me i.e. not from His Majesty's Government.

5. If the Shaikh were a sound, level-headed ruler, the fact that his rule is a "one man show" would matter very little. As, however, he is far from being either sound or level-headed I feel it is essential to try to put some check on his actions, and the most suitable means towards this end is by the resurrection of the Council which the famous Mubarak used to have. If such a Council had been in existence during the last few years I think it unlikely that the Shaikh's errors, some of which, in connection with the Date Gardens, may prove very expensive to His Majesty's Government, would have been committed. de Gaury informs me that the idea of a Council would certainly have public opinion in Kuwait behind it.

6. You will see from paragraph 8 of de Gaury's letter that he is submitting later the comprehensive report on the administration of Kuwait asked for in your telegram No.986, dated 24th May 1938.

7. de Gaury informs me that the Iraqi Press have recently commented on the brutal flogging of Al Barrak, as also on the fleeing of some panic stricken Kuwaitis to seek safety in Iraq territory.

Sd. T.C. FOWLE

Political Resident in the Persian Gulf.

ATTESTED

for Secretary to the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf.



No. C/348 U/C 49

The Hon'ble the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf presents his compliments to

1. His Majesty's Secretary of State for India, London.
2. The Secretary to the Government of India, External Affairs Department, Simla.
3. His Majesty's Ambassador, Bagdad.
4. The Air Officer Commanding British Forces in Iraq, Habbaniya,
5. The Political Agent, Kuwait.

and has the honour to transmit to him a copy of the undermentioned documents (s). which is of interest as showing the extent of the Iraqi Press campaign against Kuwait, andthe responsibility of the Iraqi Government, in part at any rate, for this campaign.

R 20/6/38

British Consulate-General, BUSHIRE. Dated 20th June 1938.

Reference to previous correspondence:

20/6/38

Description of Enclosure.

Name and Date.	Subject.
Extract from Section IV Kuwait - of R.A.F. Monthly Intelligence Summary of May 1938.	Kuwait - Press.



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EXTRACT FROM SCETION IV - KUWAIT - OF

R.A.F. MONTHLY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

of May 1938.

The Press and KUWAIT.

The Iraqi Press has duringthe month indulged in violent attacks on the Shaikh of Kuwait and his Governme nt. Reports that the Kuwaiti Liberals have decided to petition the Iraq Government demanding amalgamation of Iraq and Kuwait have been given great prominence, as have also accounts of bad administration in the Shaikhdom. In

addition the Kuwait administration is accused of encouraging the smuggling of dutiable and contraband goods into Iraq.

After a number of these attacks had appeared, the Private Secretary to the Shaikh of Kuwait wrote an open letter to the Iraq Press, which was published in "Az Zaman" newspaper; in this he advised the Iraq newspapers not to interfere in the internal affairs of a friendly Government andto stop trying by means of this unfriendly propaganda to s tir up the people of Kuwait against their lawful Government. This has, as yet, had no effect on the volume of propaganda against the Kuwait Government and as the Iraqi Governme nt control the pre ss it can only be assumed that these press attacks meet with the Iraqi Governmnt 's approval.

It seems strange, indeed, that the Iraq Governmnt, who were recently so indignant at Syrian press propaganda directed against themselves, and who threatened retaliatory action if the propaganda continued, should look with complacency on similar unwarranted and unfriendly attacks by their own press on the Kuwait administration. The Iraq press constantly refer to Kuwait as being an integral part of Basra Liwa. In this connection it is interesting to remember that during the recent debate on the Iraq - Iran Treaty in the Chamber of Deputies, one leading Deputy referred to the possibility of Kuwait being used as Iraq's outlet to the sea.



45/23

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CONFIDENTIAL.

No.

The Political Agent at Kuwait/at Basra presents his compliments to

The Hon'ble the Political Resident
in the Persian Gulf, Bushire
on S.S."VARSOVA"

and has the honour to transmit to him a copy of the undermentioned document(s).
for information.

(14)

POLITICAL AGENCY,
KUWAIT.

Dated the 18th June, 1938.

Reference to previous correspondence :

DESCRIPTION OF ENCLOSURE.

Name and Date.	Subject.
Translation of an article published in the Basra weekly newspaper "Al-Sejil" of 27th May 1938.	



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
Translation of an article in the Basra weekly newspaper "Al-Sejil" of 27th May, 1938.

BE GENTLE O EDITOR OF AL-SEJIL.

In your last issue there was an article against the firm and erect pole of Rulership in Kuwait in which you directed bitter criticism against the innocent and heroic administration of the State.

There is no doubt that this is a sin, for which it should be your duty to atone by a good act. How can it be, that Kuwait, which takes pride in her laws and the Rulership, is the only one amongst all Gods' own countries, which helps her strong neighbours to promote their propaganda, although they may not be of her own religion, and adverse to her interests.

Here is an example to prove my assertion. There is a protestant American foundation, a Hospital, choked full by the sick of the Muslim Kuwaitis, who fall a prey to their continuous religious preachings, prayers, and verses of Church hymns. Each morning its compound is full of patients including the rich, whose wealth is extracted from them by every possible means. They are compelled, by its being the only hospital in Kuwait, to come to it although it lacks proper and sufficient materials, owing to which many of the patients have passed away, a sacrifice to lack of attention. The Amirate has helped these Americans by allowing them to import all their materials duty free, notably religious books, and although this respectable Amirate receives Customs duty on all books imported or exported from Kuwait, even the Holy Koran. Forbearance in religious matters has reached its utmost, and some Imams and Muazzins do not come for morning prayers and no heed is given to the complaints of members of the



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of the congregation.

Amongst the good acts, upon which none has commented, of this Amirate, is its being the only one which has an admirable speciality of imposing internal Customs duties, as no one of the dwellers of the small villages of Kuwait, such as Jahra, Fantas etc., can take out from Kuwait City a single bag of rice or any other necessary foodstuff, without payment of one rupee, or more, per bag. The people of Kuwait look forward to the foundation of / schools with much eagerness, and they have been for the last thrity years trying to open schools and a free State Hospital, but they met with bitter opposition from Shaikh Mubarak, grandfather of the present Amir. The great toleration of the Kuwaitis has promoted them to name the Mubarakiyyah school so to please that late Amir, and the other Ahmediyyah school as a mark of encourgement and a constant reminder to the present Amir to proceed towards progress, even at a slow pace!

The hope of the people for a hospital was swept away by one angry mood from H.H. Shaikh Mubarak.

The present state of affairs in Kuwait does not permit anyone to instil into it a life of enlightment and activity, or the freeing of the public from ignorance and disease. Anyone who tries to do so will find that canes, whips and imprisonment in the "shop", which is well protected from ventilation, are ready for him. His Highness the Amir is very fond of the guitar and its strings and he always keeps very neater to him those who know how to play it. His overbearing desire, to leave all matters as they were, has promoted him to bring in Propagandists, and converts of Free Masonary, and converts of other sects of self pleasure. As to your bewailings, you newspaper man, advocates of education, lovers of reforms and supporters of personal independence for individuals, you should know



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-3-

know that there is a wide space between you and the demands of His Highness, our Amir the Preux Chevalier, may God preserve him, and his Chief Justice of the Courts, Shaikh Abdulla al-Jabir, who penalizes anyone who does not come to his Court. With the first messenger he sends notice, a fine for delaying, of a few thousands of rupees, a matter which has necessitated some of those so penalized to flee away from Kuwait, and take refuge at Zubair.

We, of the entourage, do not care in the least about such resentful persons. Know, you poor journalist, that Kuwait is proceeding on the way which pleases the entourage of her Amir, whether it pleases or angers you, O supporters of those foolish Kuwaiti youths.

I have some more strange and wonderful things which I shall write you about if you publish this my article.

In the end I pray to Allah not to displace our present dearly beloved Amir, whose administration is quite suitable to our own personal interests, and may Allah's blessings be on those who stop from teasing us.

Kuwait, One of the Entourage.

(Copy sent to S.S.O., G.S.I., & Baghdad under P.L. C/379 d. 27.6.38 & copy of have P.L. to Kuwait).

[initials] 27/6.



45/23 55

Confidential.

No.C-219

BUSHIRE RESIDENCY.
No. 783
Date 11.7.38.
CONFIDENTIAL RECORDS

Political Agency,

Kuwait.

The 24th June, 1938.

My dear Sir Trenchard,

(15)

I enclose a circular, no doubt printed in Iraq, copies of which was found pushed under doors and elsewhere in Kuwait on the 19th, and again appeared, pasted up in public places on the 24th.

The reference in the circular to the employment of foreigners is to the employment by His Highness of Izzet Jaafar, the Egypto-Syrian youngman, who is supposed to be an Italian Agent.

2. Sheikh Abdulla Salim came to me today and spoke most openly about local affairs, referring to the circular. I replied in general terms.

Yours sincerely,
[signature]

The Hon'ble Lt-Colonel
Sir Trenchard Fowle, K.C.I.E.,C.B.E.,
Political Resident, Persian Gulf,
BUSHIRE.



56

Translation of an Arabic leaflet by the Kuwait Secret Society to the People of Kuwait.

CIRCULAR No. 1.

To the people of Kuwait, the Generous, the Oppressed, the Despised, the Forgotten. To you,O people, we direct this our call, you are entitled to your rights. Our patience has been exhausted, and there remains nothing, after all the efforts which we have made to get our rights, except the defence of the soul.

In Kuwait a secret society has been formed, for the sole purpose of defending you, which has taken an Oath by the name of the Almighty God to wage a holy war for your sake, and which will never turn back untill the Almighty wills Victory for the people and shameful failure for the traitors. This holy war will, primarily, be waged in a non-violent manner, and by peaceful requests to H.H. the Amir who may, perhaps, realise his mistake and be drawn towards your wishes for progress, and your ernest desires for improvements.

As H.H. has many times openly said that he has the best wishes and intentions for his state, we now come forward to him with this circular, so that he may have no excuse, by making it an open proof against him, so that he may be held fully responsible for our holy war which may have to be continued for a long time.

The clouds of oppression overhanging Kuwait are oppressions in Laws, in the squandering of public funds, the depriving of the Kuwaiti people from progressive measures, the employment of foreigners, who act as mounts for dictator colonists, the terrorising of the public for payment of higher revenues, and oppressions which are directed against us from all points of our existance.

The society leaves aside all near and far away byegones to be byegones, acting in accordance with the Islamic Shari-at which says "God has forgiven the past", and hereby the society puts down her demands as under:-



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under: -

1. It is the duty of the Amir to submit, and to recognise that the Kuwaiti public have indisputeable legal rights and will never, by any means, submit to a despotic policy.

2. The people want to control their own interests and finances and to spend for their own progress and improvements and this cannot be realised except by making laws according to which the policy of the state may be directed, and which will protect the public funds from being used, as play money, by ignorant members of the entourage who know nothing else than the hoarding of money and driving the people to poverty by various mean ways.

3. The public want an annual grant of Rs. 50000/-, from the Oil revenues, to be spent for the sole purpose of town improvements, by way of an annual contribution to the Municipality, and this demand is a very reasonable one.

4. The public want the immediate foundation of a Hospital complete in every detail, with all the necessary surgical instruments and medical requirements, to be managed by Arab doctors, and by no means will mere promises for its foundation be accepted.

5. The public requires that all revenues derived from local products, such as Sand, Shingle and Gravel, and from tonnage and warehousing, and from all those materials which are the natural products of Kuwait, should all be spent on public welfare generally.

6. The public want the infusion of life into it materially by streching water pipes from Iraq to Kuwait, after making the necessary agreement with the Iraq Governemnt, as Kuwait is faced by great dangers, because water is life, and should any of the strong powers prevent the arrival of water into Kuwait then the public will surely die of thirst and will thus be compelled to submit without a struggle.



a struggle.

7. The public want that the real germ of disease, which is firmly set in the state, be destroyed by dispersing the entourage of evil which screens the Amir from his people, and which does not care whether the people of Kuwait die or not as long as they themselves enjoy the squandering of public funds. The people demand their immediate dispersal without the least hesitation.

8. The public want that those responsible for promulgating evil between them, and those who have robbed them of their legal rights, and those who promote the spreading of ignorance, most of whom are tricksters with mean designs, should be taken to task.

The people of Kuwait are not powerful or strong, and have therefore taken to giving advice and demanding their rights by means of circulating regular monthly circulars which will be circulated locally and outside the state. Every sincere well wisher does not doubt the legality of our rights, therefore the society jealously guards the honour of Kuwait and her Amir and appeals to the general public to help and join her, because the hand of God is with those who form themselves into a party, and no right will be lost as long as it has a claimant.

THE KUWAIT SECRET SOCIETY.



45/23

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BUSHIRE RESIDENCY
No. 784
Date 11.7.38.
CONFIDENTIAL RECORDS

Confidential.
No.C- 220

Political Agency,
Kuwait.
The 24th June, 1938.

(16)

My dear Sir Trenchard,

Sheikh Abdulla as Salim called again today and brought me the attached note, a copy of the original agreement made between Sheikh Ahmad and certain notables of Kuwait, whereby he had to form a council as a condition of his election as Ruler. (See P.G.13, Page 73, Para 3).

2. Sheikh Abdulla said that he felt that a British adviser was essential here. He would like to see, Mr.Belgrave, the adviser at Bahrein, here.

Why so many of the people wanted the British here was because they saw and admired the condition of Bahrein, and were also attached, by commercial interests and tradition to British India.

3. He, and all the people were with us. All would be well in future, if only we would give them a lead and an idea of what we wanted. He repeated that an indecisive policy would be dangerous and that underground agitation was not lessening.

4. Sheikh Abdulla, I think, possibly foresees that the present agitation may turn not only against Sheikh Ahmad but against the whole Ruling family, and knowing that in Bahrein we have supported the Ruling family views that form of administration favourably.

5. It is true, that at the moment, surprising as it may seem, the British, in this small state, are, generally speaking, popular and being looked to for a lead.

Yours sincerely
[signature]

The Hon'ble Lt-Colonel
Sir Trenchard Fowle, K.C.I.E.,C.B.E.,
Political Resident, Persian Gulf.



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TRANSLATION.

Thank God, whose help and leadership we seek. Prayer and Peace be upon our Prophet Mohammad and his followers. Religion is a guide to those in power. Unity, piety and sanctity are of the commands of God, which are to be followed by all. We, wishing for the welfare of the people, seek the approval of God. Our sympathy is with the nation, and our desire for humanity's sake is to unite, and to hold to the rope of God, because you are disunited. We have explained to our Amirs and brothers what we have agreed upon. We demanded, and still demand, from every patriot and the zealous to lead us in the right path, if our conduct is found to be not straight. We briefly publish our demands in this note among our national brothers, so that they may be in a position to understand our demands.

THE DEMANDS.

1. The reform of the Subah household to avoid any difference on the appointment of a Ruler in compliance to God's saying, "Reconcile between yourselves."

2. The appointed Ruler should head an Advisory Council "Majlis Shura" in compliance with God's saying, "Consult them in affairs".

3. A certain number from the Subah household and the people must be selected for the administration of the town, on a just and right basis.

This is the contents of the note, on which we put our signatures, and now we give below our demands as regards the consulation of the Ruler with those selected.

(1) The foreign interests, which affect the town, such as the import of benefit to it and the prevention of anything infamous from coming into it.



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-2-

(2) The settlement of cases between the subjects, in case they do not approve of the settlement by the Shar'a, so that nobody would be treated unjustly.

(3) The consideration of the requirements for the advance and improvement of the town and people, such the spreading of education and maintenance of order.

These are our demands in brief, which every wise and impartial one will guess our intentions for the reformation, and "Success is from God."



BUSHIRE RESIDENCY.
No. 785
Date 11.7.38
CONFIDENTIAL RECORDS

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Confidential.

D.O.No.C- 221

Political Agency,
Kuwait.
The 25th June, 1938.

My dear Sir Trenchard,

(17)

I enclose the reply of His Highness to your letter, in which I note His Highness confines himself to generalities and compliments.

2. As far as I am aware, there is no sign of his taking steps to form a Council or adopt or discuss the quite reasonable reform suggested in the broadsheets which have recently been circulated and pasted up in Kuwait (forwarded to you under my D.O.No.219 of 24th June, 1938) and published in articles written by Kuwaitis in the Basra newspapers.

3. It has now leaked out, probably through the Secretary's office, open to the main bazaar, and where nothing is secret, that you have suggested to the Sheikh the formation of a Council. This was well received by those of the notables who dare to express an opinion, and I received a leading notable today who formally thanked me, he said on behalf of the majority of the notables, for this action.

4. His Highness may possibly be intending to form a Council, but endeavouring to save his face by not appearing to take precipitate action, as if it had been forced upon him; and for this reason I shall wait a few days before concluding definitely that he does not intend to do so.

Yours sincerely
[signature]

The Hon'ble Lt-Colonel
Sir Trenchard Fowle, K.C.I.E.,C.B.E.,
Political Resident in the Persian Gulf,
BUSHIRE.

Ahmed Al Jabir Al Sabah

KUWAIT

احمد الجابر الصباح

الكويت

نمره
ر/٥/٩٥٢

حضرة حميد الشيم الافخم عالي المقام المحب الودود الكرنل سر فاول كي ٠ سي ٠ آى ٠ ئي ٠ سي ٠ بي ٠ ئي ٠ رئيس الخليج الفارسي المحترم

بعد السلام وتقديم الأحترام لمقامكم العالي ـ٠

بيد الخلوص تناولة كتابكم الكريم عدد سي ٣٣٣ والمؤرخ ٣٨/٦/١٨ موافق ٥٧/٤/١٩ وفهمت مابداه فخامتكم عن افادة المحب الكبتن دكورى ٠ فعليه اشكر فخامتكم على هذه النصيحة الناشئه من صميم محبتكم وحسن التفاتكم نحو المخلص ـ٠

بهذه المناسبه نوكد لفخامتكم اننا لازلنا ولم نزل باذلين اقصى جهودنا في سبيل الاصلاح والمصلحة العامة التي تويد حسن العلاقات الوديه الدائمه انشاالله بحسن توجهات حكومة صاحب الجلالة البريطانيه ـ وثق ياصاحب الفخامة اننا سالكين ماسلكه جدنا المرحوم الشيخ مبارك بكلما يمكننا وزياده ولانقتصر عن الطريقة الصالحه التي يؤول منها الخير والسعادة لبلادنا وشعبنا ومحافظين على مافيه المسرة وراحة الاسرة من كافة الوجوه ـ ونؤمل ان نكون حائزين على كمال الرضا والالتفات من لدن حكومة صاحب الجلالة البريطانيه ٠ هذا وبالختام نرجو لفخامتكم دوام السعادة والرفاهية ودمتم / مخلصكم

في ٢٦ ربيع الثاني ١٣٥٧ موافق ٢٥ جون ١٩٣٨

ا . . .

حاكم الكويت



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Dated Kuwait, 26th Rabi'-us-Thani,1357.
25th June, 1938.

No. 952/5/R

To.

The Hon'ble Lieut.-Colonel Sir Fowle, K.C.I.E., C.B.E.,
Political Resident in the Persian Gulf.

After Compliments.

I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of your esteemed letter No. C-333 , dated 18-6-38, corresponding to the 19-4-57, and have understood what Your Honour expressed as a result of the report from our friend Captain de Gaury. I thank Your Honour for the a-dvice which has emanated from your genuine kindness and good intentions towards me.

In this connection I beg to emphasise to Your Honour that I continue doing my utmost in the cause of reform and public good which , God willing, will assist (to establish) good and permanent friendly relations --due to the good attention of His Britannic Majesty's Government.

Your Honour may rest assured that I pursue, as far as I possibly can, the same policy which was pursued by our grand-father , the late Shaikh Mubarak and would do even more than that. And I would not remain contented with one method which would result in the benefit and prosperity of my country and people and preserve the well being and ease of our family in all respects and I trust to achieve the full satisfaction of His Britannic Majesty's Government (on this account).

In conclusion I wish Your Honour happiness and prosperity.

Sd. Ahmad al-Jabir- Al-Sabah.
Ruler of Kuwait.



45/23

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CONFIDENTIAL.

No. C-222

The Political Agent at Kuwait presents his compliments to

The Hon'ble the Political Resident in the

Persian Gulf, Bushire.

and has the honour to transmit to him a copy of the undermentioned document(s), with the remark that this article mentions the beating of Al-Barrak.

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POLITICAL AGENCY,
KUWAIT.

Dated the 24th June 1938.

Reference to previous correspondence :

DESCRIPTION OF ENCLOSURE.

Name and Date.	Subject.
Translations of articles from Iraqi newspapers.	Agitation in Kuwait.

4 s/c.



Translations and extracts from Iraqi newspapers.

AL KARKH (COLLOQUIAL AND CRITICAL) 20.5.1938.

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ABOUT THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE ALLEGED SECRETARY OF THE AMIR.

The Al-Sijil paper of Basra had said in its reply to the announcement by the alleged secretary, in order to refute the news published by Iraqi newspapers about Kuwait, ought to have coupled the announcement with statics showing the number of hospitals, schools, first releif institutions, libraries, Courts of Justice and technical institutes (as he did with the Bari broadcasting Station which was inspired by him, and in which he painted Kuwait as a paradise of men) so that the Iraqi papers may be convinced of the progress that is being made by this nieghbouring province. The falsification of which the secretary complained were the only weapons he himself used in his explanations. Readers may think that Iraq and Kuwait are on very friendly terms, but has Kuwait, or rather its authorities, left any means unused to enstrange this country and harm it in every respect. Have the smuggling events left any tie between the two countries unbroken, or has the expulsion of Iraqi workmen from Kuwait preserved any sympathy with Kuwait, or has the Kuwaiti authorities refusal of the employment of Iraqis and the holding back of the Iraqi farmers dues in Basra date gardens helped preserving friendship between the two countries ?. These are some of the poin points which have caused Iraq so much loss and inconvenience through the behaviour of the Kuwait authorites, let alone the loss of many lives on both sides on account of the smuggling activities of Kuwaitis or Iraqis using Kuwait as the starting point.... Kuwait is, in point of fact, an Iraqi district, and to leave it grope in the darkness of ignorance and misadministration, would pain the heart of every Arab to say nothing of Iraqis who regard it as part of their own country.

As another example of the injustice done to the Arabs of Kuwait, Al-sijil paper asserts that recently a car driven by a Kuwaiti and another driven by a Somali British Subject collided. Both drivers were arrested, but through the intervention of the British Consul in Kuwait the Somali was



- 2 -

the Somali was

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released and the Kuwaiti has ever since been kept locked up. This has created a very bad impression among Kuwaitis some of whom are thinking of approaching the Shaikh for the release of the Kuwaiti driver as well in order to put an end to unnecessary gossip and to save the reputation of the principality.

Al-Sijil learns also that since the Kuwait authorities employed a Free Mason in their offices he has been finding many customers for an Egyptian Masonic paper, and through his efforts many Kuwaitis are subscribing in that paper, while nationalist and Muslim papers are totally banned. It only remains for the Shaikh of Kuwait to supress the liberties of his people and force them to read only Masonic or Missionary papers to the complete exculsion of Islamic and Arab nationalist papers. His latest orders have been given to prevent the Al-Sijil newspaper of Basra from entering Kuwait in retaliation for what it has been writing about the demands of the intelligenzia of Kuwait. The Amir of Kuwait Must know fully well that complaints and grievances against him in his principality are growing daily and that the Iraqi press is determined to reiterate such greivances untill he has been compelled to carry out the demands of Kuwaiti nationalist elements.

27.5.1938

THE SITUATION IN KUWAIT. IS THIS JUSTICE O AMIR?

The Egyptian newspaper Al-Shabab states that there is only one school in Kuwait and one Mission Hospital. Most of the taxes and customs duties go to the pocket of the Shaikh and his staff. Kuwait, like Palestine, has been afflicted with the immigration of strangers to it. The foreigners snatch the morsel from the mouth of the natives, and the Kuwait Government protedts the interests of these foreigners.



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forigners.

On 16th March last a man was brought up to the Shaikh with the charge of inciting drivers to strike work. Only the Shaikh's servants were the witnesses. He was tied and thrown on the ground and lashed severly. He was then handcuffed with heated iron chains and cast into a dark dirty dungeon where he will surely lose his sight and health as he is dauly tortured.

Al-Karkh says it has nothing to comment on the above except to draw the Shaikh's attention and to ask him to read this news. The imprisonment of Kuwaiti nationalists and their torturing as was the habit of the inquisition courts in the dark ages is a thing for which he will have to give an account one day, and that day will not be very far.

Neither the clerk nor the selfstyled Secretary and Aide de Camp of the Shaikh of Kuwait can refute these facts. The people of Kuwait are determined to extricate themselves from the oppressions of the man whose only interest in life is to hoard money and fill his coffers and those of his nearest associates, leaving the public in misery and without schools to learn or a hospital where they may heal their wounds or cure their diseases, nor a force to maintain order, nor a court to dispence justice, nor any constructive measures that may please the eyes and hearts of the inhabitants.

"We write this while we have before us a long article about conditions in Kuwait which we have deferred for our next issue. We have taken upon ourselves the task of inserting here every information and facts about Kuwait. This we shall do as a special service to our Kuwaiti brothers, expecting neither fees nor even thanks from them", says the paper.



45/23

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C-279

Political Agency,

Kuwait.

Dated the 29th June, 1938.

My dear Sir Trenchard,

(19)

P.U.C. 17.

Would you please refer to my D.O.No.C-221 of 25th June, 1938, Para 4.

On the morning of 28th, three leading merchants of Kuwait Mohammed Thunayyan, Abdulla al Sagar, who is the notable I referred in Para 3, of the same letter, and Suleiman al Adsani, presented a letter to the Sheikh reminding him that his selection for the Sheikhdom was consequent on his agreeing to be advised by a Council, and asking for one to be formed. His Highness, who was I understand most bland, agreed immediately in principle.

Yours sincerely

Gerald de Gaury

The Hon'ble Sir Trenchard Fowle,
K.C.I.E., C.B.E.,
Political Resident in the Persian Gulf,
Bushire.

4 s/c.



45/23

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EXPRESS LETTER.

From

Political Agent, Kuwait

To

Political Resident, Bushire.

20

No. C- 235 Dated 6th July, 1938.

Subject:- Agitation in Kuwait.

The Ruler today formally approved the elected Council of Kuwait.

2. It makes for Kuwait an important occasion, and I ought perhaps to record, with some details, the immediately preceding incidents and the event.

On the morning of 28th June, as I have already reported, three of the leading merchants of Kuwait who had behind them a very large following, requested the Sheikh to agree to the formation of a Council. This he did and agreed to their conducting an election, upon which they insisted, knowing that nominations to a Council would be made by him from among his immediate entourage, and not from his family and the Notables.

3. The same night there gathered the heads of the 150 leading families of Kuwait, and they elected from among themselves 14 persons, whose names I have given in an Appendix to this letter, to be members of the Council.

It was known that if such a Council was formed and attained power, its demands, an outline of which I give in another Appendix to this letter, would include a



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"cleaning up" in the entourage of the Ruler.

4. Thus a clique, hardly to be called a party, was formed from the Sheikh's Secretaries', the Director of the Municipality, and one merchant called Khalid Zaid, which made desperate efforts to win followers. Quite large sums of money, and various privileges, were offered to any one who would default from the Council.

Even the Persians and the poor were summoned to join the Secretaries' party, but even they refused. The activities of the clique, soon seem to be futile, were bringing more and more odium on to them, and on to the Sheikh who was inevitably coming to be identified with them in the public mind.

5. There was, consequently, considerable political activity, but judging that it would not come to a head for a day or two, I thought it would be wise to avoid it all, and I therefore left by sea, for a tour on the Northern frontier, there to investigate some incursions by Iraqi policemen. On my return it was obvious that matters were fast coming to a crisis.

Either the Sheikh would have to give way in the next few hours, or he would find himself isolated.

6. On the morning of the 4th the notables and the Ruling family, and those who were in opposition to the Council, including Khalid az Zaid, assembled in the Sheikh's Diwan for the usual morning coffee-drinking, but with every intention to come to a definite conclusion before they left.

7. The members of the Council demanded His Highness' formal approval in writing, of a Council, which verbally he had sanctioned, but it now seemed had secretly tried to undermine. They spoke of his being misled by a few persons



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-3-

with private ambitions, against the wishes of the majority of his countrymen and against the interest of his family, which he neglected in favour of a few ignoble cronies.

8. His Highness asked them what would be the outcome if he withheld his approval?.

"In that case" said one of the leaders rising to his feet, and others with him, "we bid you farewell".

His Highness quickly denied that he intended to disapprove.

9. In fact, their trump card, had he done so, was ready, in the form of a petition, to be signed by all the notables, and presented at this Agency, asking for direct British Rule, a denouement which might have made piquant news in Baghdad.

10. His Highness then pretended to be, or was, persuaded of the worthlessness of Khalid az Zaid and his clique, and turning upon them, publicly denied him and his followers who were immediately jostled from the Hall, and down the stairway, into the inimical crowd outside. His motor car had already been burnt.

11. Thus ignominiously ended the attempt of the Sheikh's entourage to scuttle the Council before it was fully launched.

12. His Highness however managed to retain a semblance of his Ruler's control by postponing his signature of approval of the Council until the following day, the 5th.

13. It seemed that he still had hopes, bred no doubt by his Secretaries' advice, of being able, if only he could gain time, to break up the solidarity of the Council, and on the morning of the 5th he spent only a brief period in the



public rooms of his Palace, on the excuse of being ill. When I saw him he complained that his head was going round from so much work, and said that he hoped to alter the Council, although he had approved it in principle.

14. In the evening he ordered the release from prison of Mohammed al Barrak, the man so badly beaten last March.

15. About the same time I heard that the Secretaries' party was, as a last throw, giving it out that the Council was a result of foreign intrigue and anti-religious. This was no more successful than their former effort, and on the morning of the 6th His Highness at last signed his approval of the Council in principle, and its present members.

16. Tactfully the people of Kuwait have already submitted to His Highness, a many-signed letter of thanks for his approval of the Council.

17. The advent in the last day or two of the enervating very hot weather, is perhaps fortunate, and I have hopes that the recent political agitation, which grew up through the Sheikh's obstinacy, will now die away, and the Council settle down to useful work, under a chastened Sheikh.

18. On the whole I feel that matters have turned out fortunately for us. As your advice to the Sheikh to form a Council was known, the Council and the people feel at one with us, and grateful to you. Had formation of the Council been postponed, and not advocated by you, feeling without any doubt, would have grown, and grown rapidly, until at last there had come a serious flare-up, in which, I think, it is quite possible that the Sheikh would have lost his life. Before that point had been reached the agitators would have become deeply involved in Iraq, where they would have been offered, advice and hope.



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19. As it is, while there are no doubt still difficulties to be faced, and a small rightly nominated Council might have been preferred, at least the change in the form of local government has, I am happy to say, occurred without the firing of a shot, or even the sending of a telegram.

20. [The Council is composed of experienced men, used to weighing commercial enterprises, and conducting the affairs of their large families, and the messages I have already received from them, make me believe that the result of their deliberations, if they obtain a decree of fiscal power, will lead to the administration of the territory on more efficient lines.]

21. This is a subject, however, on which I shall hope to speak to you when I see you next week, by when I shall be in a position to say more about their intended modus operandi.

Captain,

Political Agent, Kuwait.



APPENDIX I.

75

Names and description of the first elected Kuwait Administrative Council 1938. President: Shaikh Abdulla as-Salim as-Subah, C.I.E., son of a former Ruler of Kuwait and cousin of the present Ruler.

Names.	Votes received.
1. Muhammad bin Shahin Al-Ghanim, a merchant trading with India, head of the Al-Ghanim family, which with other families form the Al-Zayid tribe, of 'Anaza origin, whose forebears came to Kuwait with the Subah family. They number in Kuwait about 2500 persons.	103
2. Shaikh Yusuf bin Issa, head of the Al-Jina'at family, originally Sabeans, numbering about 600 persons. He has an office at Bombay.	100
3. Abdulla bin Hamad Al-Sagur, a landowner and merchant trading with India, head of the Al-Sagur family, a branch of the Al-Zayid tribe. The family number about 800 persons.	100
4. Mash'an Al-Khudair, an importer, of the Al-Khudair and Al-Khalid families, originally from Nejd, numbering about 500 persons in Kuwait.	82
5. Sulaiman Al-Adsani, ex Director of the Municipality and head of the Al-Adsani family which was for 150 years, upto 1930, the hereditary Qazi family of Kuwait. The family number about 300 persons.	77
6. Sayid Ali Sayid Sulaiman, representing the old Sayid Al-Rifa'ee family, a decendent of the Prophet. The family number about 500 persons. Sayid Ali trades with India.	76
7. Mishari Al-Hasan Al-Badur, an owner of large sailing ships, representing the Al-Badur family of Nejdi origin, numbering in Kuwait about 500 persons.	62
8. Sultan Al-Kulaib, representing the Al-Kulaib and other Kuwait families of Nejdi origin of about 300 persons.	62
9. Abdul Latif Al-Thunayyan, a merchant trading with India, of the Thunayyan family, a branch of Al-Zayid, numbering about 700 persons.	61
10. Yusuf Saleh Al-Humaidhi, a merchant trading with India, of the Humaidhi family, originally of the Subai'a tribe of Nejd, numbering about 500 persons.	59
11. Saleh Al-Othman Al-Rashid, landlord and transport contractor, representing several Kuwait families of Nejdi origin, 400 persons.	50
12. Yusuf Al-Marzook, a merchant trading with India, representing the Al-Marzook, Al-Fozan etc. of Subai'a tribe of Nejdi origin, numbering about 500 persons in Kuwait.	45
13. Hamad Al-Marzook, owner of many large sailing ships, of the same family as member No. 12.	39
14. Khalid Al-Abdul Latif Al-Hamad, an exporter with a branch in Aden, representing the Al-Hamad family originally of Zubair. Members of the family in Kuwait are about 50 persons.	37

The Councils' functions and methods have not yet been precisely fixed. The electors were the entire assembly of Kuwait notables, about 150 persons, who voted publicly on the night of the 29th June 1938, the Shaikh having agreed to accept a council on the same morning.



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APPENDIX II.

Demands.

1. Fiscal power, an annual Budget, and various Administrative reforms.
2. A Free Hospital.
3. Exploitation of Kuwait's water resources.
4. "Cleaning up" of the Shaikh's entourage.
5. Recommendation of cessation of smuggling to Iraq.



45/23

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Political Agency,

Kuwait.

The 7th July, 1938.

No. C-238

To,

The Hon'ble the Political Resident

in the Persian Gulf, Bushire.

Subject:-Recent disturbances in Kuwait.

(21)

Memorandum.

Reference your Memorandum No.287-S of 25th May, 1938.

2. Please find enclosed review state of administration in Kuwait.

[signature]

Captain,

Political Agent, Kuwait.

4 s/c

Sent, with enclosure, to India Office + G. of I. under P.L. 481-S d: 28.7.38

28/7



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
ADMINISTRATION OF KUWAIT.

General.

As will be seen below the Kuwait administration costs the present Ruler very little. He has been able to buy large estates in Egypt, and place considerable sums to his private credit, without hindrance from his family or his people. In spite of this it is frequently and rightly commented upon by visitors that the people on the whole seem happier in Kuwait than in any of the surrounding countries. Open criticism of the Ruler and the administration, although growing, has been confined to certain of his notables, articles in the Iraqi newspapers, and recently some broad-sheets distributed secretly.

2. The Ruler is never tired of pointing at the administration of his neighbours, either to Iraq, where behind a facade of westernization, there is much unpleasant and best hid, or in Saudi Arabia, where punishments such as that reported in His Majesty's Minister's Summary of Events for February, para 48, and the cutting off of the right hand for theft of goods worth more than £5, are not uncommon, and where slave-trading, in spite of Anti-slavery Regulations, is reported to continue. Nothing puts the Ruler in a gayer mood than tales of the simplicity, and "Savagery" as he calls it, of the Trucial Coast Shaikhdoms. It is only fair to the Ruler to touch very briefly upon such things before beginning to describe the Kuwait administration, in which shortcomings will be readily apparent.

3. The most remarkable feature of the administration is that one of the Shaikh's cousins, also his son-in-law, Shaikh Abdulla al-Jabir, is Permanent President of the Municipality, Magistrate, Chief of Police, Director-



The Administration is dealt with below under the following headings.

(a) Finance.

(b) Justice.

(c) Education.


(d) Municipality.

(e) Security.

(f) Medical.

(g) Control and administration of the desert, Coastal villages, and Falaicha Island.

Conclusion.



(A) FINANCE

The State income and the income of the Shaikh of Kuwait are identical.

The only independent financial unit in the State is the Municipality, which will therefore be dealt with separately below. No exact account of the Shaikh's annual balance sheet is available, but the figures below are estimates, probably quite near the truth.

2. An estimated annual account of

His Highness the Shaikh.

	STATE INCOME.		SHAIKH'S EXPENSES PRIVATE AND PUBLIC.	
(a)	Sea Customs	200,000	To the Municipality for education.	2,000
	Sand, gravel & coral exit custom	100,000	Family Allowance.	
	Kuwait Port dues	15,000	Abdulla Salim	12,000
	Land Customs	70,000	Mubarak bin Hamad Mubarak.	12,000
	Net income from rents of properties in Kuwait belonging to Shaikhdom i.e. not personal.	50,000	Ali Khalifa	9,000
			Salim Hamud	9,000
			Abdulla Khalifa	2,700
	Pearl boat shares	15,000	Abdulla Jabir	4,000
	MONOPOLIES.		Abdulla Mubarak	4,800
	Ice Lemonade Intestines export Transportation Co. Sand	35,000	Daughters of Mubarak	2,000
			Subah Nasir	9,000
			6 women of Subah	3,000
	Fish market tax	5,000	Secretaries @Rs230/- monthly.	11,040
	Date gardens	150,000	Bodyguard & Fadawiya	12,000
	Landing Company at 1/3 of total profits.	30,000	Customs Officers	18,000
	Kuwait Oil Company	95,000	Household (72 persons including 2 private Secretaries)	11,000
	Returned petrol to Agent.	1,000		
	Total c/o	746,000	Total c/o	121,540



		b/f	746,000		b/f	121,540
(b)	Private income as Ahmed as Subah			Telegrams, stationery and petty contingencies in the Secretariat.		2,500
	Net income from Basra house properties.		5,000	Garage, cars (There are no petrol expenses as H.H. recovers in kind, in lieu of tax, returning surplus in exchange for cash, but under this heading is included wages of drivers and the men employed on 5 armed lorries, and all other car expenses)		20,000
	Net income from Kuwait house properties.		10,000			
	Net income from property in Egypt		7,000			
	Fish traps, camels and sheep. (This is set off against wages of herdsmen and expenses for killing for household uses etcetera		---	Donations to the poor and other contingencies including "hush money" to blackmailing Iraqi journalists, peculation among employees, visits of Syrian and Palestinian politicians, and subcription to Muslim causes.		10,000
	One share in the Landing Company.		15,000			
(c)	Percentage on Money on deposit in Banks, mostly @ 2% a total not less than £.170,000		45,400	Cairo Agent		2,400
	Total income...		Rs.828,400	Total Expenditure...		Rs.156,440

INCOME	Rs.828,400	
Expenditure	Rs.156,440	
Balance...	Rs.671,960	Or £.50,397

(i.e. Annual Saving to the Shaikh's persona Account).

3. The Ruler was paid Rs.475,000 (£.35,625) by the Kuwait Oil Company for the grant of their concession in 1935.

4. Even allowing for peculation and errors in estimates, it seems that the annual saving to the Ruler's pocket must be about £.40,000, but it is believed that the higher figure, £.50,397, is nearer the mark.

5. On the other hand with a better administration the receipts to the State would be higher.

6. That almost the whole of the State's Income should go to the Ruler's personal account is of course a grievance.



(B) JUSTICE IN KUWAIT.

General.

The sect of the ruling family and the majority of Kuwaitis is Hanbali, and the precepts of that sect therefore predominate in Kuwait justice.

2. Cases of all kinds, except petty complaints, are first heard by Shaikh Abdulla al-Jabir, the Deputy of the Shaikh and town administrator, who gives his decision after hearing both parties, often without making any written records of the complaint, defence and evidence. If however the case is of a complicated nature, with a religious aspect, he refers it to the Qazi of the Shari'at Court, either Sunni or Shi'ah, who decides it. If the case has a commercial or maritime aspect he refers it to a committee of merchants or sea captains who after hearing both parties send an oral summary of their views to Shaikh Abdulla who gives his decision accordingly. Arbitration is also resorted to by other guilds-men.

PETTY CASES.

3. Petty cases are brought before Shaikh Subah, Chief of the Night Guards, who usually deals with them by confiscating furniture or other property. It is said that he takes the proceeds for himself without having to give an account to any one.

CIVIL CODE.

4. In practice there is also a form of Civil Code. To take an example, by the Shaikh's order drivers in Kuwait drive their cars on the left of the road. If one were to be found driving on the right he could be fined or imprisoned, although no written code to cover the case exists, except perhaps the original public notice in the main square, probably long ago lost or destroyed.

COURTS.

5. There are therefore the following courts:-



There are therefore the following Courts:-

(a) The Magistrate's (the Deputy of the Shaikh and town Administrator.)

(b) The Qazis' (Sunni and Shi'ah)

(c) The Merchants'.Arbitration Court.

(d) The sea Captains' Arbitration Court.

(e) The Minor cases Court, under a member of the Shaikh's family.

5. There is no tribal Court and most cases are settled by an Arbitrator, in the tents, in the traditional manner, and by the laws of common Bedouin usage.

The following is a note by a Kuwaiti.

6. Since the inauguration of the Court, about 8 or 9 years ago, Shaikh Abdulla al-Jabir, the Magistrate, has slowly but surely drifted away from the original system. He has formed a kind of association for corruption in justice, consisting of himself, His Highness' Secretary, the Sunni Qazi, the Director of the Municipality and a certain Ali al-Mas'ad, a Court messenger and policeman. Corruption in justice is a chief cause of public resentment against the present administration, as almost every member of the public, in some way or another, is effected. Those who have not been directly effected themselves are in sympathy with some friends or near relatives who have been unjustly dealt with.

The most open and shameless aspect of Justice, or rather injustice, in Kuwait is that Shaikh Abdulla, or the Qazis, will give a certain decision in a certain case one day, and will give a reverse decision in another, but exactly similar case the next day, always having one side of the scales heavily down in favour of the party which paid a price, or rather the party which pays higher.

Shaikh Abdulla and his associates receive all



receive all the proceeds of fines and penalties imposed. As a single example, out of the many hundreds which could be quoted, I give the case of Ahmed bin Farhan, a notable pearl merchant of Kuwait, who was involved in a civil suit about two years ago. Shaikh Abdulla sent a messenger to ask him to come to court, and Ahmed, as he was engaged at that moment, told the messenger that he would come a little later. When Shaikh Abdulla received the reply he immediately went himself to the man and put his "Shumak" around his neck and lashed him very severely and ordered him to pay a fine of Rs.5000/-, which was later reduced, through the request of other notables, to Rs.2000/-. The man paid the fine and moved with his family to Zubair, cursing Kuwait and its Justice.

7. It would appear desirable for the Ruler of such a small state to take an active part in the administration of justice himself, and it is a grievance that he does not do so.

If he, with two elders of his family, formed an appeal Court, it should have a beneficial effect.

Until about 1925 it was the habit of the Ruler of Kuwait to take an active part in the administration of justice, and the Ruler sat daily for a short time, in a public place, when petitioners, who might have been prevented from approaching him, or obtaining justice otherwise, could come to him with their plaint.



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(C) EDUCATION.

General.

The conflict between those in favour of a liberal education and those in favour of technical education has not arisen in Kuwait, as there is no advanced education, and very few boys would be fit for either, if offered.

2. Nevertheless as education goes in the Arabian Peninsular, the standard is quite high. At least every boy, and nearly every girl, goes to school, if only a Koranic school, and those with aptitude (which is few among the half-negro sons of pearl divers and sailors, and the sons of Bedouin shop or boothowners, who make up the majority of the population) can go on to one of the three higher grade schools. In one of these there are employed four Palestinian school masters (approved as suitable by the Secretariat of the High Commissioner in Palestine, before being appointed in 1937.) who teach English and more advanced work than the local school masters. In addition a number of paid teachers of English, Indians and others, spread the knowledge of that language.

3. The education of the poorer school boys in the Koranic schools is paid, by ancient Nejdi Arab custom, in the following way. On passing out, the graduate, cloaked and wearing a man's sword for the first time, accompanied by his fellows parades outside the houses of all the notables in turn, and chants with his party, until the owner sends out a subscription. The same system applies to girls, who, similarly, dressed in their finest clothes, make a visit to the doors of the houses of the notables. The collection they make is duly handed to their masters.

Organization.

(a) Director General of Education



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(b) A Director of Education paid by Municipality.

(c) Total of Koranic schools 25

payment either by parents or subscription.

(d) Three higher grade schools about the standard of preparatory schools in Europe, partly maintained out of Municipal funds (see Municipality)

(e) Kuwait boys being educated abroad at the expense of their parents:-

Syria	4
India	6
Iraq	13
Saudi Arabia, in the Hejaz and Hasa	14

5. Requirements.

Some time ago, the Agency asked the General Superintendent of the Oil Company to give the Ruler a forecast of his requirements in employees, which he did on May 1938, but accompanied it by a letter, an extract of which follows:-

"........At present there seems to be little "attempt being made by the youngmen of the town to "obtain the necessary training, which in most cases "necessitates going abroad for a time to some place "where they can get it.......... I append a list "of the various types of jobs in which vacancies "may reasonably be expected. Training in the more "skilled of these will take as much as five years.

"It is essential if the Kuwaitis are to take a "full part in the skilled and technical jobs of the "Company, that fathers send their sons away and "get them trained."

6. The State, should, I think, now select a limited number of boys from the three higher grade schools, and send them for continuation of their education abroad, to be followed, when they are up to a suitable standard,



standard, by technical training, for employment known as likely to occur e.g. with the Oil Company, in W/T, Medical works etcetera.

That no State effort is being made to meet the requirements of the future is a grievance. His Highness for the last three years has occasionally lulled criticism by speaking of what he is going to do in this way.



(D) THE KUWAIT MUNICIPALITY.

1. The sources of the Municipality Income.

i ½% tax of the total tax collected by the Customs on imports, which amounts to about Rs.23,000/- per annum is transferred to the Municipality.

ii The monthly tax of Rs.1/4/- from the shops in bazaars and in the town, which amounts to about Rs.20,000/- per annum.

iii There are other small sources of income which do not exceed Rs.2,000/-. These are taxes on cars, sale of sheep etc.

The average annual income of the Municipality is therefore Rs.45,000/-.

The balance sheet of the Municipality for 1937 is attached.

2. ACTIVITIES.

Police.

The Municipality was established in 1930 by the present Ruler, who placed some of his guards at its disposal.

Building Improvements.

Improvements in Kuwait town have been made e.g. narrow streets, which were before unsuitable for car traffic, have been widened.

A long bazaar, crossing the town from the sea to the central market square was widened about three years ago, and the success of these improvements has induced the Municipality to re-condition other parts of the bazaar. A simple new fish market and a simple abattoir on the sea have been made recently.

Other improvements are required in when money is available.



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Fire.

Anti-Fire precaustions are confined to three stands of dry buckets in the market places.

How little interest the Ruler takes in the Municipal administration will be deduced from the fact that in July 1938 he had not yet visited the new fish market made in the autumn of 1937.

3. Direction of the Municipality.

The Municipality has 11 unpaid members, a permanent President and a Director.

The members and the Director are to be elected every two years by a limited number of the people, whose names are kept in a special register maintained only for the election. According to a well informed Kuwaiti the procedure of the election is as follows:-

"The permanent President, Shaikh Abdulla al-Jabir, the Town Administrator, cousin and son-in-law of the present Ruler, issues letters to the electorate, who send their replies on the day of election to three old and distinguished merchants, who are staunch supporters of the president.

These with the Director of the Municipality open the ballot box and read out the letters, and give their decision as to the names of those elected. If the result is undesired by them, they announce as elected others whom they prefer.

The members hold a weekly meeting, presided over by the Shaikh Abdulla al-Jabir, and give their views as to the requirements of the people and the town."

This "selection" instead of selection of the Municipal Council is a grievance.

(E) SECURITY.

1. There is no uniformed, or "badged", Police



Police Force in Kuwait. The Ruler has (a) some 30 personal bodyguard and hawkers called KHUDAM or servants, and (b) has a call on certain tribesmen, who receive assistance, financial and in kind, in return for not migrating for afield, and thus remaining as an available reserve to hand. These latter are known as the "FIDAWIYA" or "Devotees".

A number of KHUDAM, the personal bodyguard, are detached for the use of the town lieutenant or administrator, the Shaikh's cousin, while others are, when essential, sent out to investigate any quareel or other trouble among the Bedouins. There is no permanent desert control system. Such emissaries when sent out travel in armed lorries (given to the Shaikh by an Oil Concessionaire.)

The payment of all these men is about 40 rupees, 2 sacks of rice, and 2 maunds of dates, quarterly, but the amount varies from time to time, and usually includes a suit of clothes each summer and winter.

To recapitulate there are no Police as such but

(a) The Shaikh's bodyguard, mostly his hawkers

(b) The Fidawiya.

(c) The Lieutenant's bodyguard.

and (d) some of the less intelligent of the latter who are used as Constables and night watchmen by the Municipality. (c) and (d) are paid by the Municipality and about the same rate as the others.

2. (a) With an increasing number of foreigners in Kuwait to whom these guards are unknown personally, and therefore not immediately recognizable, a badged force is desirable.

(b) A frontier Police Post was mentioned by the Shaikh in 1936. ~~(see my letter No..... of ....)~~ but nothing has been done. As a Kuwaiti merchant



merchant speaking of Iraqi incursions said "If you will always leave your door open you must expect some undesirable people to come into your house".

The Ruler has told me that he sees little use in such a post until it can be in wireless touch with Kuwait, and therefore he proposes to wait until there is a Postal Wireless Station in Kuwait before constructing it.

(c) Under their concession the Oil Company pays for certain guards, which are provided by the Shaikh. The Ruler recently persuaded the Company that owing to the large number of Bedouins now frequenting Kuwait territory, their guards had to be increased.

At the same time he reduced his own guards by the same number.



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Balance Sheet of the Kuwait Municipality for the year 1356 (1937)

RECEIPTS.

A. INCOME.

Balance b/f from last year's account	Rs. 6473- 9-6.
Port income.	" 23963-15-0.
Bazaar Tax.	" 17972- 0-0.
Miscellaneous taxes, licence fees, etc.	" 4586- 0-0.
Refunds.	" 153- 9-3.
Sale proceeds of unpossessed land.	" 45-0- 0.
Rents of unpossessed land.	" 31- 0-0.
Rents of property owned by the Municipality	" 202- 4-0.

B. LIABILITIES.

To compensation trust for last year's account"	685- 4-9.
" the Agent of Chevrolet Cars for this year's account.	765- 5-0.
Grand total.....	Rs. 54877-10-0.



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Balance Sheet of the Kuwait Municipality for the year 1356 (1937)


PAYMENTS.

A. EXPENDITURE.

President's Salary.	Rs. 1200- 0-0.
Pays of Staff and bill Collectors.	" 5488- 0-0.
" " Watchmen, Night Guards and Inspectors.	" 13747-10-0.
Cutting of houses, widening of roads and compensation paid to owners of cut down houses, and workers'food and repair of their tools.	" 7372-11-6.
Repair of roads, cleaning and lighting of bazaars.	" 5147- 5-9.
Maintenance of watering car.	" 1046-15-0.
Maintenance of refuse carts, animals and pays of drivers and labourers.	" 3489-15-6.
Office furniture and stationery.	" 730-13-6.
Repair of rain drains, pits and water tanks.	" 747- 0-6.
Miscellaneous petty expenses.	" 191- 5-0.
Funeral of destitute persons.	" 60-15-0.
Advance expenditure on new butchery.	" 143- 2-0.
Grants in aid.	" 56- 0-0.
	Rs.39421-12-6

B. ASSETS.

Cash in hand.	Rs.13614-0-9.	
Value of property owned by the Municipality.	" 1680-4-0.	
Weights and measures in stock for sale.	" 161-8-9.	" 15455-13-6
	Grand total.......	Rs.54877-10-0.



(F) MEDICAL.

Hospital.

1. The only hospital in Kuwait is that of the American Mission to Arabia, which has 12 beds for males and 12 for females. There is no X Ray but an electrically-lit operating table.

Charges are made for medicine and for all attentions, including those to out-patients, and even the poor - and they are very poor in Kuwait - have to bring something in kind, if not in cash.

2. Dispensary.

The free Dispensary is maintained by the Government of India which is very much appreciated. The Surgeon, who is in charge of it, is also Quarantine Medical Officer. He has London degrees.

3. Quarantine.


There is a Quarantine Station building outside the town, recently, on advice of the Resident, repaired by the Shaikh. The Quarantine Medical Officer receives no pay or allowance from either the Municipality or the Ruler of Kuwait, as at Bahrain, for his at times arduous Quarantine duties.

Ruler.

Shaikh Ahmad, by one of the conditions whereby the American Mission were allowed to establish themselves, receives for himself, and for his household, free treatment at their hospital. Dr. Thoms of the Mission informs me that it is a fact that throughout Shaikh Ahmad's Rulership the Mission have never received any payment from him, or any present other than most trivial personal ones, in exchange for these services.

Article 8 (c) of the Kuwait Oil Company's Concession reads as follows:-

"The




"The Company shall provide, free of charge, medical service for its employees, and the Shaikh and his family shall have the right to such medical service and necessary medical supplies free of charge."

GENERAL CONTROL.

There is very little if any control of the persons who come here and set up as medical men. Some of these resort to quite fantastic medicines and operations.

There is no Kuwait Medical Officer of Health.

It is a grievance of the people of Kuwait that while the Shaikh has taken care to acquire free medical attention and supplies for himself, the poor and others have to pay for hospital attention, or anything more than that which they can obtain in the Government of India free dispensary. For this last I constantly receive the thanks of the people to the Government of India.



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(G) CONTROL AND ADMINISTRATION OF THE DESERT, COASTAL VILLAGES AND ISLAND OF FALAICHA.

(1) DESERT.


At the largest village Jahra there is always camped the Fidawiya Chief, who is so ill-paid by the Ruler that he is always, so Colonel Dickson informs me, on the point of leaving him and transferring his allegiance to Ibn Saud. This poor creature is the sole "official" of Kuwait between the town and the Iraqi frontier, and it can scarcely be wondered at that the Iraqi Police are tempted to cross the frontier sometimes.

When some serious dispute is reported the Shaikh sends out a party of his KHUDAM to investigate, settle the matter or report. No member of the Shaikh's family is engaged in this work, nor is there any form of permanent desert control other than that mentioned above. If there is to be caravan control and smuggling is to be stopped probably three frontier posts will be required.

(2) KUWAIT VILLAGES.

The Kuwait villages, of which there are six, and three fishing hamlets have no appointed headmen.

The villages suffered during the Ikhwan troubles when they were stormed and abandoned. Some of the wells for the date gardens, from lack of money have never been repaired again, or used since, and the few still surviving date trees are doing very badly in consequence. Walls have fallen down, and sand encroaches. So narrow is the margin between a livelihood and starvation for the inhabitants, mostly poor fisher folk that unless paid to do so, they usually cannot afford to band together to carry out such simple public works as are necessary. As they pay customs to the Ruler on all goods taken by them



by them out of the Gates of Kuwait, they might well consider themselves entitled to some form of State assistance, but it is doubtful if they are sufficiently politically conscious to do so.


(3) FALAICHA ISLAND.

The Island now has, according to the Ruler 4 to 5000 inhabitants, but in fact probably rather less. They pay taxes e.g. the pearl boat tax, but receive no State assistance of any kind. The hereditary Emir is a rather unimpressive cadet of the Subah Ruling family, who is seldom at Falaicha, and leaves representation of Government, such as it is to one of the inhabitants, more a servant than a Governor.

The Agency Surgeon visited the Island this year, and was presumed to be the first medical man to do so since the Residency was temporarily established there over a hundred years ago.

It appears possible that the water supply on Falaicha Island could be greatly improved, and it may be that there will be found the future water supply of Kuwait. The Ruler has just recently been induced to pay for the visit of some experts to investigate there and elsewhere.

That he has not done so before is a grievance.



CONCLUSION.

From the above it will be seen that

The main grievances against the Ruler are

(a) His own insouciance and way of life.

(b) His retention of the State Income.

(c) His lack of attention to the administration of justice.

(d) Lack of some educational facilities for a limited number, i.e. particularly technically and liberally for the cadets of the Ruling family, who wish to work and be the Kuwait officials of the future.

(e) That the Municipality has almost no income, and that the elections to its Council are, it is alleged, rigged.

(f) That the Ruler receives free medical attention and that the poor do not. That there is not even a X Ray in Kuwait.

(g) That nothing serious has been done about exploring for water.

In addition, while they are not public grievances, there are individuals who wish to see the General Administration and Control and medical supervision improved, a badged Police Force, Police Posts established in the desert, and smuggling stopped.



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Telegram Q

From Political Agent, Kuwait.

To Political Resident, on "Vita."

No.230.

Dated and received the 11th July 1938.

(22)

Shaikh of Kuwait agreed after public pressure on July 6th to formation of Council under presidency of Shaikh Abdullah Salim and on July 9th to declaration by it that governmental control will be in future in its hands.

2. Council has informally expressed its entire devotion to British policy. Comprehensive report in post.

POLITICAL AGENT.

12/7.



45/23 101

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BUSHIRE RESIDENCY.
No. 831
Date 16.7.38
CONFIDENTIAL RECORDS

Confidential.

C- 246

Political Agency,
Kuwait.
The 12th July, 1938.

My dear Sir Trenchard,

Attached to this letter will be found a translation of the declaration of the function of the new Kuwait Council, which was signed by the Ruler at noon on the 9th July. (I received a copy of the declaration informally by a messenger from the Council on the morning of the 10th).


2. The President had taken the declaration to His Highness earlier on the morning of the 9th, but as Shaikh Abdulla as-Salim, the President, explained to the Council, on his return to them, His Highness had broken down so completely in the face of this document, which takes away from him the control of the State's income, that he deffered signature for a few hours.

3. It will be seen that the declaration gives very considerable power to the Council. This it had to do, because, once embarked on the scheme, there could be no turning back. Any compromise would have meant, sooner or later, great danger to the members of the Council. It is this last fact that makes me think that the Council may possibly be found to have a rather surprising degree of solidarity and permanence.

4. I am still receiving from the Council informal messages to say that their object is to strengthen the confidence of His Majesty's Government in their devotion to British policy for Kuwait. They hinted that the Ruler had not in recent years been so loyal as he might have been, a failing that they hope is now eradicated.

The Hon'ble Lt-Colonel
Sir Trenchard Fowle, K.C.I.E., C.B.E.,
Political Resident in the Persian Gulf,

4 s/c



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5. With regard to the Article 3 of the Declaration they assured me, by informal message, that nothing in it is to be taken as meaning that His Britannic Majesty's Government is not be responsible for Kuwait's foreign relations.

They suggest that any clarification that may be thought necessary can be made in an exchange of letters. They would they say have preferred to consult me about the wording of this article, but speed was essential to their success, and therefore they were obliged to forgo sucha reference.

6. In accordance with Article 4 of the Declaration the Council have already issued public notices to say that, pending formation of an Appeal Court, all persons who wish to appeal from the judgement of the Magistrate, may do so to the Council, which will temporarily act as a Court of Appeal.

7. A family meeting of the Subah is now sitting to place the administration of the Subah estates on a sounder footing, arranging the shares to which each member should be entitled, and so on. Hitherto the estates have been administered by Sheikh Ahmad, or rather his Secretary, with little or no reference to the family.

8. His Highness has not yet informed me in writing of the formation of the Council, or its functions, and so far has only verbally informed me that he has established a Council - and without offering any comment.

9. As I shall be seeing you in the next day or two I have deferred any action in the matter of the Council until I have discussed it with you, and received your instructions.

Yours sincerely
[signature]



103

Translation of the Law Governing the powers of the Kuwait Administrative Council as granted by H.H. the Ruler of Kuwait on the 9th July 1938.

We, the Ruler of Kuwait, in accordance with the resolution passed by the State's Administrative Council, do confirm and sign this law about the powers of the Council, and we have ordered that it may be put into effect.

Article 1. The people are the source of power, as represented by the Council of their elected representatives.

Article 2. The Administrative Council has to establish the following Laws:-

(a) The Law of the Budget, viz. the proper control of all the State's income and expenditure and its diversion in a just manner, with the exception of the personal properties of the Al-Subah, with which the Council has no right to interfere.

(b) The Law of Justice, the purpose of which is to establish the religious and common Law in such manner as to ensure the proper administration of Justice between the People.

(c) The Law of Public Security, the purpose of which is to ensure security within and out the town (of Kuwait) upto the furthest points of the frontier.

(d) The Law of Education, the purpose of which is to establish Laws for education, that it may proceed in line with that in progressive countries.

(e) The Law of Public Health, the purpose of which is to establish Laws of Health which will protect the State and its inhabitants from the dangers of illhealth and diseases of all kinds.

(f) The Law of Improvements, which includes the construction of roads out of the town, the building of jails, the boring of wells, and whatever general improvements are necessary within and out of the town.

(g) The Law of Emergency, the purpose of which is to establish laws which will empower the authorities to take whatever measure is necessary to ensure public security in the State, in the event of an emergency.



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-2-

(h) Whatever law it is found necessary to establish in the interests of the public, it is the right of the Council to establish it.

Article 3. The Administrative Council is the place of refrence for all Treaties, Concessions, Monopolies and Agreements, both internal and foreign. If any of these (i.e.existing) has to be renewed, it shall not be considered to have become legal unless seen and approved by the Council.

Article 4.As the State has no Court of Appeal, the powers of such a Court will rest temporarily with the Administrative Council until such time as a special court is established for the purpose.

Article 5. The President of the Administrative Council represents the Executing Authority in the State.

Signed, Ahmad Al-Jabir Al-Subah



45/23

105

Telegram	Q.
From	Political Resident, Bushire.
To	H.M's Secretary of State for India, London.
Copy by post	Secretary to the Government of India, External Affairs Department, Simla.
	Political Agent, Kuwait.

No.269

Dated 14th July 1938.

147

Correspondence ending with my Express Letter No.C/334 of June 18th. Agitation in Kuwait.

Political Agent, Kuwait, reports that Shaikh of Kuwait after considerable public pressure which took a peaceful form had been applied by notables and merchants of Kuwait, has agreed to formation of a Council with a voice in the adminis--tration. Council is friendly to us. Details by post after discussion with de Gaury who arrives here July 15th.

Fowle

Copy sent to Govt. of India and Kuwait under P.L.No. 379-S, dated 14.7.38

Copy sent under P.L. 397-S d. 18/7/38, to Baghdad.
18/7.



45/23.

106

Telegram Q

From Political Resident, Bushire.

To H.M. Secretary of State for India, London.

Copy by post to Government of India, Simla.

Copy given to Political Agent, Kuwait, at Bushire.

No.275

Dated the 16th July 1938.

My telegram No.269 of July 14th. Kuwait Agitation.

I have discussed question with de Gaury. The situation in Kuwait is that council under Presidency of Abdulla Salim cousin of the Shaikh have obtained complete control of the administration and for the time being the Shaikh is a cypher.

2. If the Shaikh had formed a council as he originally promised (see P.G. 13 page 73 para 3), or if he had taken the verbal advice of His Majesty's Government (vide correspondence ending with India Office telegram -h.22 No.986 of May 24th), or had even at the last moment formed a council as suggested in my letter -h.45 of 18th June to him (enclosed with my Express Letter -h.47 No.C/334 of 18th June) this council might well have remained advisory instead of an executive one.

3. I think His Majesty's Government should take some notice of the change, and I suggest I be authorised to send the following message to the Shaikh begins:

I am directed by His Majesty's Government to inform Your Highness that they have heard of your

establishing/



107.

establishing a council. His Majesty's Government trust that this step will lead to the prosperity of Kuwait and to the continuance of the happy relations which have existed in the past between the Ruler and His Majesty's Government. Ends

4. I am forwarding full report by post.

FOWLE

Er 16/7.

Copy sent under P.L. No. 392-S d. 16/7/38 to Govt. of India.
Er 16/7.

Copy sent under P.L. 397-S d. 18/7/38 to Bagdad.
Er 18/7.



45/23. 108

Confidential

The Residency,

Bushire, the 18th July 1938.

D.O.No.396-S

O/C

p.106.

Could you please refer to correspondence ending with my telegram No.275 of 16th July 1938 on the subject of Kuwait Agitation, in which I promised a further report. This telegram was sent after discussion with de Gaury who arrived here on the 15th, and whose reports had preceded him.

2. The course of events has been as follows. de Gaury duly presented my letter, mentioned in paragraph 4 of my Express Letter No.C/334 of 18th June 1938 to the Shaikh, who in reply confined himself to generalities and compliments. He apparently had little idea of taking my advice. The fact that this advice had been given leaked out to the bazaars through the Shaikh's Secretary - no Arab can ever keep his mouth shut even when it is to his interest to keep it closed. The advice in itself, however, was well received by the local notables, one of whom when calling on de Gaury, thanked him for the advice tendered.

p.45 p.47

3. Leaflets probably printed in Iraq continued to be issued by the "Kuwait Secret Society", and further attacks on the Shaikh - specifically mentioning the brutal flogging of Al Barrak (see paragraph 7 of my Express Letter of 18th June 1938) - continued to appear in the Iraq Press. These leaflets and articles referred to the unfortunate Bari

p.47

broadcast/

.T. Peel, Esquire,
The India Office,
London.



broadcast arranged by the Shaikh which was the beginning, though not the cause, of the present trouble (see paragraph 3 of my Express Letter No.C/117, dated 25th February 1938), critised strongly the Shaikh's entourage, especially Izzet Jaafar, an importation from Syria, and demanded various reforms. (It was this same Izzet Jaafar who had sent the broadcast to Bari).

– K.40, p. 61

4. Shaikh Abdulla bin Salim, the Shaikh's cousin who recently received the C.I.E., then called on de Gaury with a copy of the original agreement made between Shaikh Ahmad and certain notables of Kuwait whereby he - the Shaikh - had promised to form a Council as a condition of his election as Ruler (see P.G.13 page 73 paragraph 3. The Shaikh has never called this Council). Shaikh Abdulla himself, as one of the ruling family, felt that the present agitation might turn not only against the Shaikh but also against the family as a whole, and was shrewd enough to trim his sails to the rising wind. He is in any case, however, an individual possessing some learning and modern ideas.

5. Three of the leading merchants of Kuwait, who had a large following behind them, then requested the Shaikh to form a Council, the membership of which would be elective. This the merchants insisted on, knowing that nominations to the Council would be made by the Shaikh from his immediate entourage, and not from his family and the notables. The same night the heads of the 150 leading families of Kuwait met and elected to the Council 14 persons. The Shaikh through his palace clique consisting of his

Secretaries/



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secretaries, the Director of the Municipality, and a merchant called Khalid Zaid, made a last desperate effort to win followers, large bribes, and various privileges being offered to any one who would default from the council. These efforts were fruitless and merely brought further ~~mdxt~~ odium on the Shaikh and his clique. On the 4th July the rival parties, on the one hand the Ruling family and the notables, and on the other the Palace clique, including Khalid Zaid, assembled in the Shaikh's Mejlis for the usual morning coffee drinking, and for a final trial of strength. The following is an extract from de Gaury's report.

"The members of the Council demanded His Highness' formal approval, in writing, of a Council, which verbally he had sanctioned, but it now seemed had secretly tried to undermine. They spoke of his being misled by a few persons with private ambitions, against the wishes of the majority of his countrymen and against the interest of his family, which he neglected in favour of a few ignoble cronies.

His Highness asked them what would be the outcome if he withheld his approval.

"In that case" said one of the leaders rising to his feet, and others with him, "we bid you farewell".

His Highness quickly denied that he intended to disapprove.

In fact, their trump card, had he done so, was ready, in the form of a petition, to be signed by all the notables, and presented at this Agency, asking for direct British Rule.

His Highness then pretended to be, or was, persuaded of the worthlessness of Khalid az Zaid and his

clique/



clique, and turning upon them, publicly denied him and his followers who were immediately jostled from the Hall, and down the stairway, into the inimical crowd outside. His motor car had already been burnt."

This was the only act of violence that took place during the agitation.

6. His Highness postponed his formal consent to the Council for another two days, but finally on the 6th July signed the necessary document. Of the Council de Gaury writes

> "The Council is composed of experienced men, used to weighing commercial enterprises, and conducting the affairs of their large families, and the messages I have already received from them, make me believe that the result of their deliberations, if they obtain a decree of fiscal power, will lead to the administration of the territory on more efficient lines."

The President is Abdulla Salim.

p.103

7. The powers of the Council, as you will see, from the document which I enclose, are extremely wide. (Some of the Law reads somewhat like the declaration of the French Assembly in 1791. Abdulla Salim, who keeps an Arabic Encyclopaedia, doubtless referred to it for guidance when drawing it up!). In fact the Shaikh, as I stated in my telegram quoted above, for the time being is a cypher.

8. The general policy of the Council can be seen

from/



from the new Law. Article 3 which concerns Treaties, monopolies and agreements is of special interest to us. Even here, however, the Council leave the signature of such documents to the Shaikh. The stipulation that any acts of the Shaikh need the Council's consent, whether under this article or any other, is not so revolutionary as might appear. All the other Rulers on the Arab side of the Gulf, in Bahrain, the Trucial Coast, and Muscat, invariably consult their family and notables before taking any step of importance, whether this is with regard to an agreement with His Majesty's Government, a concession to an Oil Company, or a matter of internal administration. The difference that in Kuwait the powers of the Council have been made so extensive, and reduced to writing, is entirely due to the crass stupidity - I can use no milder term - of the Shaikh (see paragraph 2 of my telegram quoted above). Even after he had agreed to the Council as elected, the Shaikh perservered in futile intrigues to undermine the Council, which merely served to exacerbate both them, and public opinion generally.

9. Reference the leakage of my letter to the Shaikh, referred to in paragraph 2 above. de Gaury is of the opinion, and I agree with him, that the arrival of this letter and its fortuitous leakage, came at the pyschological moment. The movement against the Shaikh was, as has been seen, overpowering, and a trial of strength between the popular party and the Ruler, in which the former were certain to have won, was bound to have occurred, either now or in the immediate future. My advice to the Shaikh to form a Council naturally fitted in with the plans of the popular party, and is indeed one of the main reasons that for the moment at all events they are extremely friendly towards us. Had the movement, however, come to a head

without/




without this advice to the Shaikh, in popular opinion His Majesty's Government might well have been supposed to have supported the Shaikh - tacitly if not actually -, and the victory over the latter would have been hailed as one over His Majesty's Government. As it is without our in any way offering encouragement to the popular party, they are well disposed to us, while the coup d'état, which is what the movement amounts to, has taken place - as de Gaury points out in one of his reports - without "the firing of a shot or the sending of a telegram". The absence of telegrams is as gratifying perhaps as that of rifle shots. One can imagine circumstances in which the Council in the course of their struggle with the Shaikh might have bombarded the neighbouring Arab States - especially Iraq - with appeals for help. Iraq at least would undoubtedly have been only too glad for an excuse to meddle in Kuwait affairs. In this connection de Gaury informs me that the present Mutasarrif of Basra is especially active in openly advocating Iraq interference in Kuwait - "which is really a province of Iraq".

10. With regard to the future. It is of course much too early to lay down definitely what our policy should now be in Kuwait, but generally speaking, we should, I think, try and maintain a measure of balance between the Shaikh and the Council. Towards the latter we should endeavour to retain their present confidence, so that they turn to us naturally for unofficial advice, while making it clear that we still consider the Shaikh the Ruler, and officially responsible for Kuwait's relations with His Majesty's Government.

11. I have no doubt that, though the Council at

present/



present are sincerely pro British, as time goes by and their position becomes assured, they may display "nationalistic" tendencies which may at times take an awkward turn. But the Council is in being, as a development it was inevitable, and we must make the best of the good start which we have obtained.

12. I would like to stress the fact, which both the Shaikhs of the Persian Gulf and ourselves must realize, that the idea of popular movements, such as the present one at Kuwait, has now permeated the Arab States, and must be taken account of. Even on the backward Trucial Coast, at Debai (vide paragraph 3 of my Express Letter No.C/445 of 8th July 1938) the opposition party to the Shaikh asked for certain popular reforms. In this connection also please see Government of India letter No.F.230-N/35, dated 6th November 1935, and connected correspondence on the subject of agitation in Bahrain. This agitation has died away for the moment, as certain measures have been taken to comply with the demands of the Baharana, but I shall not be surprised if the latter at some future date put up further demands for increased participation in the local government. Such movements will doubtless arise elsewhere on the Arab Coast, and it is obvious that as the chief exponents of democracy His Majesty's Government cannot ally themselves with the Shaikhs to stamp these movements out, even if this were practicable. What we can, and what in my opinion we should do, is to try by exercise of judicious influence, to ensure that such movements come to fruition by a process of "peaceful change", as at Kuwait, rather than by violence, and that they should, also as at Kuwait, be well disposed towards us.



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13. Various attempts were made by the popular party to enlist the open support of de Gaury, who, however, acted with tact and discretion in refusing to be drawn into the struggle, thus exemplifying the dictum contained in the Introduction to the Political Department Manual: "The best work of a Political Officer is very often what he has left undone".

14. I am afraid that I have made this rather a lengthy letter, but in view of the importance which the events of the last few weeks will probably have on our relations with Kuwait in the future, I have thought it as well to put on record a more or less complete account of them.

I am sending* copies of this letter to Metcalfe, to Peterson with copies of recent telegrams quoted, and to de Gaury.

TC. F.

* sent under P.L.No.397-S of 18/7/38.

18/7



45/23

116

COPY OF TELEGRAM.

From H.M. AMBASSADOR,
BAGDAD.

To F.O. LONDON

Date 19. 7. 38

No. 60 SAVING.

Time despatched

Airmail.

24

23/7

Addressed F.O. No. 60 Saving, repeated to Bushire No. 3 Saving.

Iraqi press is giving prominence to news of creation of Legislative Council in Koweit and Minister for Foreign Affairs asked me about it this morning.

I should be grateful for information as to powers to be given to Council.

PETERSON.

D 25:26 6,000 -3/4 516 -11/06 R Z



117

Telegram	Q.
From	H.M's Secretary of State for India, London.
To	Political Resident, Bushire.
Copy by post to	Secretary to the Government of India, External Affairs Department, Simla.
	Political Agent, Kuwait.

No. 1326

Dated 26th received 27th July 1938.

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Baghdad telegram No. 60 of 19th July. Kuwait Council.

2. What reply should be made to Iraqi Foreign Minister ?

3. Report which you have promised by mail not yet received.

Secretary of State
for India.

27/7



45/23.

118

Telegram Q

From Political Resident, Bushire.

To Secretary of State for India, London.

Copy by post to Government of India, External Affairs Department, Simla.

Copy given to Political Agent, Kuwait.

No.297.

Dated 27th July 1938.

– p.117.

Your telegram No.1326 of 26th July.

My report should be with you and Bagdad in a few days.

2. I think it probable that the Iraqi Government will try to use Council as a means of interfering in the internal affairs of Kuwait. I venture to suggest therefore that the reply to the Iraqi Foreign Minister should be on the following lines.

3. That the Shaikh has now in conformity with public opinion established a Council (its powers have been published in the Iraqi Press) to assist him in the administration of his State, and that His Majesty's Government expect that this step will lead to the increasing prosperity of Kuwait. That the formation of this Council in no way affects the relations between the Shaikh and His Majesty's Government who still consider him responsible for Kuwait's relations with them.

FOWLE

Copy sent to Govt. of India under P.L. No. 476-S. d. 27/7/38.

3 S.C



45/23

119

Confidential

No.480-S of 1938

British Residency and Consulate General,

Bushire, the 28th July 1938.

To

The Political Agent,

Kuwait.

O/C

Subject: Kuwait Administration.

Memorandum

The following is the result of our discussions which we have had here towards assisting the Shaikh and his new Council in the administration of Kuwait.

2. One of the most important points is finance. Excluding oil, you informed me that the Customs does make up about three-quarters of the State's income. The Customs administration at present is carried on by an official under the Shaikh, and could probably, in your opinion, be much improved. It would be well worth the State's while, we think, for it to obtain the services of an expert Customs official to visit Kuwait for a short period, say a month, in order to reorganize the Customs administration, and put it on a modern footing. A Customs official from Bombay visited Muscat and Bahrain for this purpose some years ago, with extremely satisfactory results. The Customs receipts in each State, after this reorganization scheme had been put into effect, increased considerably. The same results would doubtless come about at Kuwait. In order to assist the work of the Customs official the Council could do some spade

work/



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-2-

work first in collecting figures of revenue and expenditure etc., say over the last five years, and any other details which they think might be useful for him.

3. I think therefore that we should try and get an official of the Imperial Customs Service from India to visit Kuwait. On your return to Kuwait please make this proposal tentatively and verbally to the Shaikh and the Council, and let me know their reaction. If it is favourable I will approach the Government of India on the subject, letting His Majesty's Government know that I am doing this. The deputation of the Customs officer will of course cost the State something, but will be well worth while. If as a result of the Customs officer's visit the Customs receipts go up, as they should, the political as well as the financial effect should be good. The Council will associate the increased revenue of its State with the efforts of a British officer, and will therefore be all the more inclined to accept a British Financial Adviser, which we think the State ought to have. As oil revenues come in, and the finances of the State become more complicated, the State must have an Adviser of some sort from outside, and from our point of view it is essential that he should be a British official, and not for instance an Iraqi. The importance of the post of Financial Adviser lies in the fact that, since there are few subjects which are not connected with finance, either directly or indirectly, whoever is appointed will have considerable indirect influence in political, as well as financial, matters, and

might/



-3-

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might make for himself a position such as Belgrave holds at Bahrain. It is essential therefore that the Adviser should be of British nationality. While we are arranging for the Customs official we can also be looking about for a possible Financial Adviser, and while I am on leave I will consult the Home Departments.

4. In addition therefore to making the proposal about the Customs expert to the Shaikh and the Council, you could also privately and personally sound Abdulla Salim on the question of an Adviser. As you informed me, before recent events he expressed to you his opinion that an Adviser, like Belgrave at Bahrain, would be an excellent thing.

Sd.T.C.FOWLE

Political Resident in the Persian Gulf

ATTESTED

9c. 28.7.38

for Secretary to the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf.



45/23

122

Telegram Q.

From Political Agent, Kuwait.

To Political Resident, at Bahrain.

No.255

Dated 9th received 10th August 1938.

(26)

Kuwait situation.

Shaikh of Kuwait who has been extreme-ly supine and who had in my absence allowed Council to take over a large number of his arms reserve now informs me that the Council is getting too strong for him. They wish him to remove his Private Secretary formerly the "all in all", and against whom I think Council has good reason to complain. They also wish to appoint the controller of the reserve arms which they have acquired from him. It is of course most undesirable that they should do so ("the army as a political instrument") and the appointment should remain in the Shaikh's hands, and as a matter of principle the Shaikh should if he wishes be able to retain the services of his unpopular Secretary, although I think it inadvisable. (Shaikh on this point alone seems determined).

2. In the circumstances the Shaikh and Shaikh Abdullah Salim this morning asked me to take what material and political measures I could for their support. The Shaikh said that he would willingly accept an Adviser, and he has written to me today

formally/



2.

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formally appealing to his Majesty's Government for assistance in his plight. Copy in post.

3. He asked me to see the Council and I have agreed to do so in the Agency with the Shaikh at 5 o'clock, when I shall hear Council's point of view. I shall tell them that I will not give them any answer until later.

4. Please say if you agree that I must explain that (a) Shaikh must be left with the right to appoint his own Private Secretary and Commander of main arms reserve which position is tantamount to Commander-in-Chief.

5. Both Shaikhs say that it is rather unlikely that there will be armed clash. Shaikh has some Bedouin and a palace reserve.

6. If you instruct me as above it will deter Council from further attempts to undermine Shaikh's position.

7. I think however that it would be wise to be prepared to show material strength as well. I therefore propose that a sloop and armoured car be prepared to move if required but not before as I hope to avoid such use and (omission ? antagonism) of at present friendly Council.

8. A bother is that I have no sure means of communicating in case of trouble and I request that a mobile wireless be sent immediately to be at Agency. I regard this as important and urgent. I shall telegraph again after seeing Council.

Political



124

Signal from Political Resident, at Bahrain, to Captain H.M.S."Deptford" dated the 10th August 1938.

A122

Political Agent, Kuwait, reports some prospect of trouble there and I may have to ask Senior Naval Officer to send "Deptford" there.

Do you think you could postpone your departure for Yas till I receive fuller information ?

Phoned to Jufair.
11-30 a.m.
10.8.'38.



45/23

125

Telegram Q.

From Political Resident, at Bahrain.

To Political Agent, Kuwait.

No.T/190

Dated 10th August 1938.

/122

Your telegram No. 255 of 9th August.

I shall await your further report regarding Council's point of view before reaching any conclusions. Meanwhile, I do not repeat not think you should attempt to use any influence in regard to Private Secretary. Arms question is more complex. I appreciate your point of view, but presumably Council's attitude is at least partly dictated by motives of self-preservation and they seem to have some rights under Article 2(c) of the Council Charter. I should like your further views in the light of the above.

/103

2. I will arrange for sloop if necessary but would prefer to omit armoured car unless definitely required for protection of British subjects.

Weightman



126

45/23

Telegram Q.

From Political Resident, at Bahrain.

To Air Officer Commanding, British Forces in Iraq, Habbaniya.

Repeated to Political Agent, Kuwait.

No. T/194

Dated 10th AUgust 1938.

7/122

Political Kuwait reports indications of possible serious disagreement between Shaikh and his Council, and asks for mobile wireless set to be sent immediately to Agency in view of un--reliability of telegraphs.

Grateful if arrangements could be made accordingly. I shall inform you of develop--ments.

Weightman.



127

MESSAGE from Captain H.M.S."Deptford" to Political Resident, Bahrain.

See f.124

Departure for Yas postponed. When do you expect to receive fuller information? Request you will give early information if "Deptford" is required at Kuwait.

Phoned from Jufair.
12.00 noon.
10.8.'38.

27



128

Telegram Q.

From Political Agent, Kuwait.

To Political Resident, at Bahrain.

No.257

Dated and received 10th August 1938.

(28)

Immediate.

Reference my immediately preceding telegram.

I have seen Council who agreed that the military appointments must be made by Shaikh.

2. They were adamant about Shaikh's Secretary and so was he.

3. I told Council that there must be no disturbance and Shaikh that I will give him answer in about two days.

4. We might support Shaikh in the matter of his Secretary but say that if there is in future any complaint supported by evidence of intrigue by him against Council that we will not do so.

5. We should also tell Shaikh verbally

(a) that there must be no repetition of this kind of thing

(b) that he must in future help his Council to work along right lines when necessary sitting with them

(c) that we are acceding to his request for an Adviser which he has this morning/confirmed in writing/



129

2.

writing.

(d) that he must take steps to improve his corps of guards (on which he has over economised)

(e) that he must take over his reserves as agreed by Council

6. A sloop and armoured car should come here this week. I am forwarding an outline of factors in situation but taking everything into consideration I am of opinion that above indicates best course.

Political



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45/23

Telegram Q.

From Political Resident, at Bahrain.

To Political Agent, Kuwait.

No. T/192

Dated 10th August 1938.

Important.

p.128

Your telegram No. 257 in which you refer to your immediately preceding telegram. I have received your telegram No. 255 beginning "Kuwait situation" and ending "after seeing Council" Have you sent me a telegram No. 256 ?

p.122

Weightman.



131

45/23

Telegram Q.

From Political Agent, Kuwait.

To Political Resident, at Bahrain.

No. 258

Dated 10th received 10th August 1938.

(29)

Kuwait situation.

Shaikh today without a word to me sent a negotiator to Council who told them that if Shaikh could not keep his Secretary he would abdicate. Council refused to reply having promised me not to touch matter for a few days.

Political

11/8



132

45/23

Telegram En clair.

From Political Agent, Kuwait.

To Political Resident, at Bahrain.

Unnumbered.

Dated 10th received 11th August 1938.

30

Your telegram No.T/190.

I am telegraphing early to-morrow morning.

Political



133

Telegram Q.

From Political Resident, at Bahrain.

To Senior Naval Officer, Persian Gulf Division, H.M.S.Shoreham.

No.T/193

Dated 11th August 1938.

There is possibility of unpleasant situation in Kuwait requiring presence of sloop. I need not trouble you with details at this stage but could DEPTFORD move up to-morrow 12 August towards Kubbar prepared to go into Kuwait if necessary? In that event I would signal full details and objects, repeating to DEPTFORD.

Weightman

(Transmitted G Deptford) R



134

Telegram Q. .

From Political Agent, Kuwait.

To Political Resident, at Bahrain.

No.259

Dated and received 11th August 1938.

31

1125
1128

Your telegram No.T/190.

Reference my telegram No. 257 paragraph 4. I was naturally inclined to support existing Ruler (at the risk of aligning ourselves with unpopularity) but mind of Shaikh has now given final coup to his prestige.

2. If we say that we will have nothing to do with dispute, in which he has invoked our aid, he may give way to Council but not abdicate. How he intends to rule in that case I do not know. It would be impossible for him and for us and I should think finally he will make up his mind to go.

3. If he does abdicate probability is that (omission) ?Abdullah S. will be acclaimed. There are people who despise the whole family.

4. It should be unnecessary to be overbearing about arms and ammunition reserves as Council have already their control by a nominal Ruler and (Omission) defer to our views on defence.

5. An important factor is that since formation of Council there is no political leaning towards (omission)

6. Omission of armoured car. ?and Sloop

depends/



135

2.

depends on plan adopted and circumstances.

7. Thanks for action taken wireless.

Political



45/23.

136

Telegram Q.

From Political Agent, Kuwait.

To Political Resident, at Bahrain.

No. 260.

Dated and received 11th August 1938.

32

130

Your telegram No. T-192. No.

Political.



45/23

137

Telegram Q.

From Political Resident, at Bahrain.

To H.M's Secretary of State for India, London.

Repeated to Secretary to the Government of India, External Affairs Department, Simla.

Copy by post Political Agent, Kuwait.

No.T/194

Dated 11th August 1938.

Important.

Reference Fowle's letter No.396-S of July 18th. Kuwait.


108

Political Agent, Kuwait, reports serious disagreement between Shaikh and Council over question of retention of Shaikh's Private Secretary Izzet Jaafar. Council demand his removal and Shaikh who insists on retaining him has requested our inter- -vention and support. A further cause of disagree- -ment existed over question of control of arms reserve but after discussion with Political Agent Council have admitted Shaikh's right to retain this.

2. Political Agent reports that both Shaikh of Kuwait and Shaikh Abdullah Salim, President of Council, think armed clash unlikely, but he has sug- -gested that sloop and armoured car be sent there. He suggests support of Shaikh over question of Secre- -tary with warning that evidence of future intrigue on Secretary's part will involve ~~xxx~~ loss of our support.

3. Political Agent also reports that

Shaikh/



138

2.

Shaikh has now asked for an Adviser, apparently to be selected by us.


4. I have had further telegram to-day reporting that Shaikh has sent message to Council threatening to abdicate unless his Secretary remains. Council, having promised Political Agent not to touch matter for a few days, have sent no reply.


5. Our open support of Shaikh in direct opposition to Council over question of his (highly undesirable) Secretary can only result in our losing favourable position at present held (cf. Fowle's letter referred to above). There can be no politi--cal justification; it involves backing inevitable ultimate loser; and it opens up far more dangerous potentialities than possible abdication of present Shaikh. In the circumstances I am instructing Political Agent as in my immediately suceeding telegram.

Resident

Copy sent to Kuwait under P.L. No. C/538 d: 11-8-38

[initials] 11/8.





45/23

139

Telegram Q

From Political Resident, Bahrain.

To Political Agent, Kuwait.

Repeated Secretary of State for India, London.

Secretary to the Government of India, External Affairs Department, Simla.

No. T/195

Dated the 11th August 1938.

IMPORTANT.


My immediately preceding telegram (not repeated to Kuwait) describing situation there.

To my mind it is quite impossible to afford Shaikh support either moral or material in direct opposition to his Council for the sole object of retaining a foreign intriguer as his Secretary. If Shaikh chooses this issue for trial of strength with Council he should recognise that he does so against our advice and with no prospect of support. Please ~~inform~~ advise him accordingly. No political advantage can accrue to us by interference, and we cannot afford to lose favourable position we hold at present over an affair of this nature.

2. So far as proposal for Adviser is concerned, is this made with support of Council ? For obvious reasons we cannot take it up in present circumstances until Council have indicated agreement, preferably in writing.

3. I am asking for sloop to move up in direction of Kubbar Island, prepared to go in to Kuwait if situation requires it. But it is of first importance

to



140

to obviate any possible belief that it is sent for support of Shaikh's (foreign) Secretary. I shall not therefore ask for it to move in unless there is prospect of outbreak involving danger to lives and property of British subjects. I shall only ask for armoured car as last resort.

4. Please use your best endeavours to make Shaikh see sense. He should have learnt by experience the strength of public opinion which will be behind Council against unpopular Secretary. If he uses intelligence he can still gain rather than lose prestige in yielding to Council on this issue.

RESIDENT.



45/23

142

Telegram Q

From Air Head Quarters, Iraq.

To Political Resident, at Bahrain.

Repeated O.C. No.203 (FB) Squadron, Shaiba, Basra.

No.0625.

Dated the 11th and received the 12th August 1938.

34

Refat p. 126

Can send mobile wireless set. Will you require British operator to remain at Kuwait. Understand de Gaury is on recess. Presume Residency closed. Is there suitable accommodation and security for British operator. Pending reply am despatching flying boat to anchor off Residency as a temporary measure.

AIR OFFICER COMMANDING, IRAQ.

12.8.'38.



143

Telegram Q.

From Senior Naval Officer, Persian Gulf.

To Officer Commanding, H.M.S. DEPTFORD.

Dated 11th received 12th August 1938.

(35)

Following for Political Resident

Your 0601. (T/193, p.133)

I have approved Deptford's proposal to sail tomorrow twelve.

Phoned
from Jufair.

[initials]



144

45/23

Telegram	R.30
From	Political Resident, at Bahrain.
To	Political Agent, Kuwait
Repeated to	H.M's Consul, Basra, for favour of delivery if in Basra.

No.T/196

Dated 12th August 1938.

Immediate.

p. 139

In view of instructions in my telegram No.T/195 of 11th August I consider you should remain Kuwait and report by telegram or air mail.

2. DEPTFORD leaves for KUBBAR this afternoon.

Resident.



145

45/23

Telegram Q.

From Political Resident, at Bahrain.

To Air Officer Commanding, British Forces in Iraq, Habbaniya.

No.T/197

Dated 12th August 1938.

p.142

Your 0625 of 11th August.

De Gaury is not on recess and can arrange for operator.

Resident.



45/23

146

Telegram	En clair.
From	Flying-boat No.K8858
To	Air Headquarters, Habbaniya.
Repeated	Political Resident, Bushire, at Bahrain.

No.F13.

Dated and received the 11th August 1938.

Returning to Basrah. Heavy sea renders landing and anchorage unsafe at Kuwait.

K8858.



45/23

147

Telegram Q.

From Senior Naval Officer, Persian Gulf Division, H.M.S.Shoreham.

To Political Resident, at Bahrain.

Repeated to Commander, H.M.S.Deptford.

No.0437/Z

Dated and received 12th August 1938.

36

1.133

Your telegram No.T/193 of 11th August.

I would be glad to know details as early as possible.

Senior Naval Officer.



148

45/23

Telegram Q.

From H.M's Secretary of State for India, London.

To Political Agent, Kuwait.

Repeated to Political Resident, at Bahrain.

Copy by post Secretary to the Government of India, External Affairs Department, Simla.

No.1441

Dated and received 12th August 1938.

37

Immediate.

p.139. Reference Resident's telegram No.T/195 of 11th August.

If you have not already made suggested communication to Shaikh please defer action pending receipt of further telegram from here which it is hoped will reach you shortly conveying full instructions.

Secretary of State
for India.



45/23

149.

Telegram G.T.C.

From His Majesty's Consul, Basrah.

To Political Resident, at Bahrain.

No. Nil.

Dated and received the 12th August 1938.

38

Your telegram No.T/196 of 12th August.

Can you please repeat. Government Telegraph Code only held by me.

CONSUL.



150.

45/23

Telegram Q.

From Political Agent, Kuwait.

To Political Resident, at Bahrain.

No.262

Dated and received 12th August 1938.

39.

Your telegram No. T/195.

Please consider cancelled my telegram No. 262 about my visit.

Political

PR.

13/8.



151.

45/23

Telegram	G.T.C.
From	Political Resident, at Bahrain.
To	H.M's Consul, Basra.
No.T/198	
Dated 13th August 1938.	

-p.144. Please treat my telegram No.T/196 as cancelled.

Resident.



152

45/23

Telegram Q.

From Air Headquarters, British Forces, Iraq.

To Officer Commanding, 84(B) Squadron, Shaibah, Basra.

Repeated to Political Resident, at Bahrain.

No.Z/468 a

Dated 12th received 13th August 1938.

(40)

Immediate.

Further to my O N 3 of 12th August.

One Valencia with operator and wireless set arriving Shaibah for delivery to Political Agent, Kuwait, approximately 6.30 A.M. G.M.T. 13th August. Arrange with Political Agent, Kuwait, to meet aircraft at Kuwait landing ground. Valencia to be under your orders on arrival Shaibah. Valencia to remain Shaibah Saturday night and return here by day on Sunday. Inform 203 Squadron.

Air Headquarters.



153

45/23

Telegram Q

From Political Agent, Kuwait.

To Political Resident, at Bahrain.

Repeated Secretary of State for India, London.

No.264.

Dated and received 13th August 1938.

(41)

1/148

India Office telegram No.1441 of 12th August.

I have not made communication and wait the instructions.

2. Incidentally the Secretary in question is an old Persian Khan Bahadur Salah who has managed State for years and not a Syrian who wisely left yesterday.

3. Feeling against Secretary is very high otherwise situation is quiet.

POLITICAL AGENT



45/23.

CONFIDENTIAL.

154

No. C/541.

The Hon'ble the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf presents his compliments to

The Secretary to the Government of India,
External Affairs Department,
Simla.

O/C.

and has the honour to transmit to him a copy of the undermentioned documents (s).

2. In his telegram No.255, dated 9th August 1938, Political Agent, Kuwait described the individual as "Private Secretary", who, according to paragraph 3 of Political Agent's Report of 7th July 1938 on the Administration of Kuwait (vide enclosure to Residency Printed Letter No.481-S, dated 28th July 1938) was the Syro-Egyptian (Izzet Jaafar).

Office of the Political Resident
in the Persian Gulf,
Camp, Bahrain.

Dated 13th August 1938.

Reference to previous correspondence:

India Office telegram No.1441 of 12th August 1938.

Description of Enclosure.

Name and Date.	Subject.
Kuwait telegram No.264 of 13th July 1938.	Kuwait Agitation.



155

45/23

Telegram Q.

From Political Resident, at Bahrain.

To Senior Naval Officer, Persian Gulf Division, H.M.S. Shoreham.

Repeated to Air Officer Commanding, British Forces in Iraq, Habbaniya.

No.T/ 199

Dated 13th August 1938.

I had hoped by now to be able to give you clearer appreciation of position in Kuwait but so far I can only give you the following.

2. Shaikh was forced by public opinion recently to approve formation of Council of influential residents which has assumed major executive functions. A few days ago Council demanded inter alia removal of Shaikh's ~~xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx~~ Persian Secretary. ~~xxxxxxx~~. Other questions were adjusted but Shaikh refused to part with Secretary and Council was adamant in demanding removal. Shaikh spoke of abdication unless Council yielded and requested our aid.

3. Political Agent reports that actual outbreak is unlikely, but we cannot altogether ignore the possibility of disturbances. It is, however, undesirable that sloop should appear off Kuwait until receipt of H.M.G's decision which I await. Hence my request that sloop should stay in vicinity of Kubbar.

4. To Senior Naval Officer only. I

have/



156.

2.

have verbally given Captain of DEPTFORD an outline of the position.

Resident.



157

45/23

Telegram S.

From Senior Naval Officer, Persian Gulf Division, H.M.S. Shoreham. via DEPTFORD.

To Political Resident, at Bahrain.

No. 0904

Dated and received 13th August 1938.

(42)

I have not yet received any details regarding the situation at Kuwait.


p.133 I agreed that DEPTFORD should move to Kubbar Island as I assumed from your telegram No.T/193 of 11th August that matter was urgent, but I assumed also that I should be kept fully informed of any situation which might require presence of a sloop.

I am sure that you will appreciate that it is essential for me to have this information in all cases in order that I may be in a position to arrange movements of few ships at my disposal to best advantage.

Please inform me (a) details of situation (b) with what object DEPTFORD would pro--ceed to Kuwait (c) how long you anticipate she would be there.

Senior Naval Officer.

Kh 18/8



45/23 and 33/51

158

Telegram En clair.

From Political Agent, Kuwait.

To Political Resident, at Bahrain.

No.1420. (PA I)

Dated the 13th and received the 14th August 1938.

IMPORTANT.

43

Field W/T established. All urgent messages should be addressed to me at c/o Basrah Aeronauticas until further notice. Please inform all concerned.

POLITICAL AGENT.



159

45/23 & 33/51

Telegram G.T.C.

From Political Resident, ay Bahrain.

To H.M's Secretary of State for India, London.

Senior Naval Officer, Persian Gulf Division, H.M.S.Shoreham.

Commander, H.M.S.Deptford, Bahrain--radio.

No.T/201

Dated 14th August 1938.

Until further notice please address C/o Aeronauticas, Basra, all urgent messages for Political Agent, Kuwait.

Resident



45/23

160

Telegram S

From Political Resident, Bushire, at Bahrain.

To Senior Naval Officer, Persian Gulf Division.

No.T/202.

Dated the 14th August 1938.

161

My immediately succeeding telegram refers to your 0904 (p.157) dated the 13th August which crossed my T/199 (155).

WEIGHTMAN .



45/23

161

Telegram Q

From Political Resident, at Bahrain.

To Senior Naval Officer, Persian Gulf Division.

No.T/203.

Dated the 14th August 1938.

I have been awaiting His Majesty's Government's instructions hourly for 2 days and cannot reply finally to your 3 questions until they arrive, but following may serve temporarily.

A. Bitter feeling between Shaikh and Council over question of Secretary, with public supporting Council. Violence not very probable but quite possible.

B. Should outbreak of violence occur or appear probable after communication of His Majesty's Government's reply to Shaikh's request for support, we should issue usual warning to all parties against damage to lives and property of British subjects. I should then ask for Deptford to move in to Kuwait.

(1) for moral (deterrent) effect as in similar occasions (e.g. at Dubai recently)

(2) for refuge for British subjects in last resort.

(2) is improbable but must be borne in mind.

C. I cannot foretell at the moment, but I shall bear in mind importance of delaying Deptford as little as possible.

I have written privately to you.

WEIGHTMAN.



45/23.

162

Telegram Q.

From H.M's. Secretary of State for India, London.

To Political Resident, at Bahrain.

Repeated Government of India, Simla.

Political Agent, Kuwait.

No. 1450.

Dated and received 14th August 1938.

44

p.137

IMMEDIATE.

Your telegram No. 194-T of 11th August.

Though it is possible that Secretary's removal might be desirable in itself in view of his unpopularity with Council I am very doubtful as matter of principle of wisdom of recognising any right on the part of Council to dictate to Shaikh on the question of appointments to his personal entourage . This might set up very undesirable precedent. I am further concerned at Shaikh's threat of abdication. This is a possibility which needs careful consideration in view of the serious consequences that may ensue and it seems xx undesirable that situation should develop in a way that may result in his abdication on this issue.

2. I would therefore urge that effort should be made to come to a compromise which will save Shaikh's face while at the same time satisfying wishes of Council. Most satisfactory course might be for Council to withdraw their demand for Secretary's removal and for Shaikh after a decent interval to dispense with his services of his own accord. But method of endeavouring to effect this



2

163

this might be left to De Gaury's discretion. His main approach would of course have to be to Shaikh, and he might inform the latter that while we appreciate his objection to admitting any right in Council to interfere in questions of appointments to his personal staff we suggest that he should be well advised to make a change on his own initiative within a reasonably short period, if Council withdraw their demand for Secretary's removal. Political Agent would then take such informal steps as are possible to induce the Council to withdraw. Unless de Gaury sees strong objection I suggest that he should endeavour to secure a compromise on these lines but I would be content to leave procedure to be adopted with this object to his discretion.

3. As regards suggestion of British Adviser I will await information as to Council's attitude. If, as I trust, that is favourable, such might be of considerable value in easing difficulties between Shaikh and Council.

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA.



45/23.

164

Telegram Q.

From Political Resident, at Bahrain.

To Political Agent, Kuwait,
c/o Aeronautical, Basra.

No. T-204.

Dated 15th August 1938.

p162

Demi-Official.

India Office telegram No. 1450 of August 14th.

I expect you will be communicating with both sides at once and I should be grateful for immediate telegraphic report of result with particular reference to question whether any disturbance is now likely requiring presence of sloop.

WEIGHTMAN.



45/23

165

SECRET AND PERSONAL.

Office of the Political Resident
in the Persian Gulf,

Camp, Bahrain,

D.O. No. C/545.

15th August 1938.

PC

By the time this reaches you, you will have tried out the India Office compromise, and I suppose there is an outside chance that it may work. I confess I am not optimistic since I am sure that if anything quite so simple had had a reasonable prospect of success you would have gone for it before you sent your first telegram. However there has been an interval for " cooling - off " , and perhaps that has had some effect.

2. I do not, of course, know personalities in Kuwait, but from information gleaned from recent reports it seems to me highly improbable that any genuine rapprochement can now occur between the Shaikh and the Council. (Actually the Secretary row gave him a great chance, and if he had set his course wisely he ought to have been able to take quite a lot of wind out of the Council's sails. However he failed to do so and proved once again his gift for making it impossible for us to help him adequately). As I understand it our object is to try to keep a fairly even balance between the Shaikh and his Council. At the same time if we are to attempt to even things up a little at the moment (the scales being well down on the Council's

Captain G.S.H. de Gaury, M.C.,
Political Agent, Kuwait.



166

2

Council's side) the nature of the weightage to be used must be approved by us. And it must be so selected that it does not present the Council with all the propaganda value and enable them to mobilise public opinion against both the Shaikh and ourselves. In this Secretary row the only possible point on the Shaikh's side was the " personal appointment " aspect, and though that might appeal to us as reasonable enough, would it to anyone in Kuwait ? It was unfortunate I misunderstood the reference in your first telegram to "Private Secretary" (in recent correspondence the "Private Secretary" has been Izzet Jaafar and Khan Bahadur Salah was the " Secretary") but whichever it might be, is it strictly correct to regard him as purely a member of the Shaikh's private entourage ? Both of them - and particularly the Persian - have been, as I see it, very much political appointments for the purpose of dealing with public affairs. It seems to me that it would be just about as accurate to describe Goering or Goebbels as members of Hitler's personal entourage. But I should be grateful for your comments on this.

3. The next point is this. I seem to remember that either Sir Trenchard or you told me that the Shaikh had considerable funds salted down in Syria or Egypt in preparation for a flit at any time. If this is so this idea of abdication is no new thing - it may happen any moment - and we need not be in such a fritter of anxiety to prevent it. If, then, the Shaikh is a likely starter for Syria in any event (barring unqualified support from

us,





167

3

us, which can scarcely be forthcoming) would it do us any great harm if he went fairly soon ? Would it not be better to let him go before he has collected too much oil money - and sent it out of the country ? And if he is to go can we not acquire a little public merit out of it ? We do want a British Adviser in and I should have thought that we might stand a good chance of getting one in with everyone's approval in Kuwait as the result of a change of Shaikhs following just such an affair as this . What do you think about this ?

4. The final question is this. If there is a new Shaikh in the near future, who are the likely candidates and whom would you put your money on ? The part of your telegram No. 259 dated 11th August on this point was rather corrupt and I can only guess that your choice was Abdulla bin Salim. I suppose his C.I.E. means ~~that~~ he is pretty thoroughly persona grata with us, though he seems to have had something of a reputation as an intriguer in the past. Is he the sort of man who could, in your opinion,

(a) work in with but hold his end up against the Council

(b) be relied on not to embarrass us whenever we try to help him

(c) be induced to accept a British Adviser ?

I shall be most grateful for a reply by special messenger to Basrah and thence by air. I have put off my departure for Karachi but I don't want to wait beyond

Saturday



Saturday n
could have
inferred I
results fr



4

148

Saturday next if possible, and it would help a lot if I could have your reply before then. As you will have inferred I am not hopeful about genuine and permanent results from this suggested compromise.



Telegram

From

To

No. T-205-

Dated 15th

IMPORTANT.

Imperial A

to Kuwait

care of yo



169

45/23.

Telegram G.T.C.

From Political Resident, at Bahrain.

To H.M's. Consul, Basrah.

No. T-205-

Dated 15th August 1938.

IMPORTANT.

Could you please arrange to collect from Imperial Airways and send urgently by special messenger to Kuwait cover for Political Agent which is being sent care of you by pilot of Tuesday's west bound flying boat.

WEIGHTMAN.



Telegra
From
To
Repeate
No. 04
Dated

Kubbar
you c
she w
Deptf
Khor
H.M.S
Augus

Teleg
From
To
Repe
No.
Date

16th for



45/23

170

Telegram Q.

From XxXxX.Senior Naval Officer, Persian Gulf, H.M.S. Shoreham.

To Political Resident, Camp Bahrain.

Repeated H.M.S. Deptford.

No. 0448.

Dated (and received) 15th August 1938.

45

I did not wish to keep H.M.S. Deptford at Kubbar longer than is absolutely essential. Propose if you concur that she should return to Bahrain now where she would be within 20 hours' steaming of Kuwait. H.M.S. Deptford will have to leave Bahrain on August 22nd for Khor Jarama and Bombay. No other ship available till H.M.S. Shoreham and H.M.S. Fowey arrive at Khor Jarama August 25th and August 26th respectively.

- Senior Naval Officer.

Telegram Q.

From Political Resident, at Bahrain.

To S.N.O., P.G., H.M.S. SHOREHAM, Bombay.

Repeated O.C., H. M.S. DEPTFORD, Bahrainradio.

No. T-207.

Dated 15th August 1938.

Your 0448 dated 15th August. (*above*)

Could you possibly wait till tomorrow 16th for reply.

Wieghtman.



Telegram
From
To
No. PA 3.
Dated and

IMPORTANT

Shaibah a

Telegram
From
To
Repeated

No. T-296
Dated 15t



45/23.

171

Telegram En clair.

From Political Agent, Kuwait, via Shaibah.

To Political Resident, at Bahrain.

No. PA 3.

Dated and received 15th August 1938.

46

IMPORTANT.

1158

PA1 13/8 For Basrah aeronautics read Shaibah aeronautics. Please inform all concerned.

-0805-

Telegram G.T.C.

From Political Resident, at Bahrain.

To H.M's. Secretary of State for India, London.

Repeated S.N.O., P.G., H.M.S. SHOREHAM.

O.C., H.M.S. DEPTFORD.


No. T-206.

Dated 15th August 1938.

1159

My telegram of 14th August No. T/201, For "Basrah" read "Shaibah".

Resident



Telegr
From
To
No. 26
Dated

of 14t

(a)

(b)

(c)

2.
I impr

3.

4.
indic
later.



45/23.

172

Telegram R

From Political Agent, Kuwait.

To Political Resident, at Bahrain.

No. 266.

Dated 15th received 16th August 1938.

46

p.162

Reference India Office telegram No. 1450 of 14th August.

I saw Shaikh this evening who informed me

(a) he was sending his Secretary on long leave tonight

(b) He thought Council would not much want British Adviser


(c) He wanted Adviser and everything as in Bahrain (he repeated this several times).


2. In connection with sub-paragraph (a) above I impressed on him not to send any message to Council ~~xxxxxx~~ ? takeable as compliance with a demand of theirs.

3. Sloop as far as I can see is not needed.

4. Reference final settlement by compromise indicated in India Office telegram I shall communicate later.

POLITICAL





45/23.

173

Telegram Q.

From Political Resident, at Bahrain.

To S.N.O., P.G., Warship Shoreham.

Repeated O.C., Warship Deptford.

Political Agent, Kuwait.

No. T-208.

Dated 16th August 1938.

Political Kuwait reports sloop no longer required so far as he can see. I therefore concur in Deptford's return Bahrain.

Grateful thanks for your cooperation.

RESIDENT

Telegram Q.

From Political Resident, at Bahrain.

To Political Agent, Kuwait.

No. T-209.


Dated 16th August 1938.

172

Reference final paragraph of your telegram No. 266 of 15th August.

If it would serve any useful purpose for us to have discussion I could fly up and meet you Basrah Thursday. Please telegraph your views.

RESIDENT.





45/23.

174

Telegram Q

From Political Agent, Kuwait.

To Political Resident, at Bahrain.

No. 267.


Dated and received 16th August 1938.

(47)


Reference my immediately preceding telegram.

I confirm that Secretary has left Kuwait and situation is normal.

POLITICAL



Telegra
From
To
No. 26
Dated (
I will



45/23

175

Telegram Q.

From Political Agent, Kuwait.

To Political Resident, Camp Bahrain.

No. 268.

Dated (and received) 16th August 1938. 173


Your telegram No. T/209 of 16th August.

It would be very helpful for me to have discussion.

I will meet you Basrah Thursday.

- POLITICAL.

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45/23.

176

Telegram G.T.C.

From Political Resident, at Bahrain.

To Air Officer Commanding, Habbaniya.

Repeated O.C. 203 F.B. Squadron, Shaibah.

No. T-214.


Dated 17th August 1938.

IMPORTANT.

I am flying by Imperial Airways to Basrah tomorrow Thursday for most important consultation with Political Agent, Kuwait, and it is essential that I return to Bahrain Friday afternoon as I leave for India Saturday morning. As Imperial Airways cannot accomodate me on return journey Bahrain could you possible arrange for machine to bring me down from Basrah to Bahrain Friday afternoon. I should be most grateful for assistance.

Please address reply en clair care of Airways Basrah.

Weightman.





4923

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CONFIDENTIAL.

No. C-263

The Political Agent at Kuwait presents his compliments to
the Hon'ble the Political Resident in the
Persian Gulf, Bahrain.

11/8

(49)

and has the honour to transmit to him a copy of the undermentioned document(s).

POLITICAL AGENCY,
KUWAIT.

Dated the 10th August 1938.

Reference to previous correspondence:
Telegram No. 255 of 9th August 1938

DESCRIPTION OF ENCLOSURE.

Name and Date.	Subject.
Translation of a letter No. R/5/1028 dated 9.8.38 from H.H. the Ruler of Kuwait, to the Political Agent, Kuwait. Copy of letter No. C-256 dated 10.8.38 from the Political Agent, Kuwait, to H.H. the Ruler of Kuwait. Translation of a letter No. Nil. dated 10.8.38 from H.H. the Ruler of Kuwait to the Political Agent, Kuwait.	Agitation in Kuwait.



CONFIDENTIAL

No. C-265

The Political Agent at Kuwait presents his compliments to the Hon'ble the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, Bahrain.

and has the honour to transmit to him a copy of the undermentioned document(s).

POLITICAL AGENCY,
KUWAIT.

Dated the 10th August 1938.

Reference to previous correspondence:

Telegram No. 255 of 9th August 1938

DESCRIPTION OF ENCLOSURE.

Name and Date.	Subject.
Translation of a letter No. R/5/1028 dated 9.8.38 from H.H. the Ruler of Kuwait, to the Political Agent, Kuwait.	Agitation in Kuwait.
Copy of letter No. C-256 dated 10.8.38 from the Political Agent, Kuwait, to H.H. the Ruler of Kuwait.	
Translation of a letter No. Nil. dated 10.8.38 from H.H. the Ruler of Kuwait to the Political Agent, Kuwait.	



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Translation of a letter No. R/5/1028, dated 12th Jamad-ul-Thani 1357 (9.8.38) from H.H. the Ruler of Kuwait, to the Political Agent, Kuwait.

After compliments,

As there are troubles in the town, I request His Majesty's Government to intervene for settlement of the dispute.

Usual ending.





179

Copy of letter No. C-256 dated 10th August 1938, from the Political Agent, Kuwait, to H.H. the Ruler of Kuwait.

After compliments,

Your Highness yesterday again told me that you would like to have a British Adviser.

2. I would request Your Highness to confirm the same.

Usual ending.

Translation of letter No. Nil. dated 13th Jamad-ul-thani 1357 (10.8.38) from H.H. the Ruler of Kuwait, to the Political Agent, Kuwait.

After compliments,

With pleasure I have received your letter No. C-256 dated 10.8.38 about a British Adviser, and I confirm to you that I have asked for the same.

Usual ending.





180

Personal and Secret.
C-268

P. 165

Political Agency,
Kuwait.
17th August, 1938.

(50)

My dear Weightman,

Many thanks for your Secret and Personal D.O.No. C-545 of 15th August, 1938, received today the 16th August at noon by R.A.F. aeroplane. P. 172

2. With reference to Para 1, you will have now had my telegram No.266 of 15th August, 1938, I agree that the India office compromise would have been difficult to pull off. Do you agree that the present compromise is good enough for our purpose ?. It is that the Sheikh has not dismissed his secretary but sent him on indefinite leave (He is about 75 years old.).

The "cooling off" was admittedly more on Sheikh's side than that of the Council. In view of the strength of their own and public opinion they did well in keeping order as long as they did. I am sure that if the secretary had not left last night there would have been a serious disturbance today or tomorrow.

3. With reference to Para 2, I agree that any genuine rapproachement between the Sheikh and Council now seems very far off, if not quite impossible. Quite recently, inspite of all my hints and suggestions, he was still taking them as if they were the enemies instead of his government. I agree with you entirely in your remark at top of Page 2 of your letter and I think that "the nature of the weightage" must be soon thought of and I make some suggestions below in this letter. I agree that the personal appointment aspect would not have appealed to people in Kuwait in a way it would have to us.

Weightman Esquire, I.C.S.,
Officiating Political Resident
in the Persian Gulf, at Bahrein.

Personal and Secret.
C-268

Political Agency,
Kuwait.
17th August, 1938.

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Weightman Esquire, I.C.S.,
Officiating Political Resident
in the Persian Gulf, at Bahrain.



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-2-

4. With regard to the misunderstanding about the name of the Private secretary it would have been better if I had explained that it was Khan Bahadur Mulla Saleh, who formerly, and for the last forty years or so, was in fact Kuwait Government, and the first and the only Kuwaiti Adviser of the Sheikh. You could imagine what a position he achieved for himself and ofcourse the real tussle was, as it were, between two rival governments.

5. Since the formation of the Council the Sheikh was driven to call him his"private secretary". Right up until the last moment Mulla Saleh was undoubtedly hopeful of smashing the Majlis. He had tried to rouse the Persians, of whom there are about twenty thousand to support him, and it was this, called by the Council "The Revolt of the Persians" which determined them more than anything else to get rid of him, finally and completely,

6. With regard to Para 3 of your letter His Highness has considerable financial reources in various banks. I know his main deposit account sometime two years ago exceeded £.120,000, and since then it must have been considerably enlarged and would include another £.50,000 or so from oil sources. He owns two good properties in Cairo and part of the old Hashimite Waqf near Alexandria called Hafrat ad Dowar.

7. I think myself that the Sheikh is one of those people who, ruthlessly, have determined to make every possible penny, quite regardless of everything but immediate personal interest in that connection, and so he may have long had the idea of going when he had "made his pile". On the other hand as so often happens, I expect that he would always be wanting and to hang on just a little bit longer, until the next cheque come in and inspite of the Council's financial control he still has gains by stopping here. He can still live,



-2-

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-3-

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surrounded by retainers, almost free, out of the produce of his flocks and reources in kind. Only today I heard from Harris, Manager of the ~~Imperial Bank of Iran,~~ Ottoman Bank, Basra that a periodic payment of £.1000/- by the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company to the Sheikh's account has been changed by the Sheikh's instructions to the name of, he thought, Subah bih Ahmad Jabir, who is his son aged about eleven years. Harris promised to confirm this. It was a rather mysterious account which was apparently not in connection with the Kuwait Oil Company. Obviously too there are good many perquisites of office for a Ruling Sheikh, whatever the constitution. On the other hand the Sheikh told me that in accordance with the Council's inaugural law he had promised that he would at the end of the year, when it is due, transfer the Kuwait Oil Company's cheque, about £.7000/, to the Council and all the main resources of the country will now go into the Council's hand; so that he can't be considered to be "screwing" any longer.

8. It seems to me that whoever is politically on the underside for the moment here is in favour of a British Adviser. It is not so long ago since the present members of the Council were sending me messages to say that they wanted an Adviser to control the Sheikh. Now that they are in office I do not think they would favour one for a moment. It is not so much the advice they dread as his "interference" and hundred percent efficiency. However I foresee that the time may come when the Council will begin to fall out among themselves, and I dare say, although there are no signs of it at the moment, that an opposition outside the council may form and presumably will drift to the Sheikh's side. There may come a moment when the Council ask for assistance In the interval, it is possible, out of zeal and rawness, they may be rather a nuisance, and without really meaning to do so may raise serious issues , or by some hasty order



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-4-

cut across agreements or the oil concessions. I hope not, and I will endeavour to coach Abdulla Salim behind the scenes. This is hardly a Political Agent's business and I feel that either they ought to have an Adviser for "Foreign Affaires (including relations with Oil Company) and Defence" if nothing else, or that those two subjects must be clearly reserved to the Sheikh.

9. Reference the question of abdication and possible successor to Sheikh Ahmad, if he went, as mentioned in Para 4 of your letter. First I should say that, today, the Sheikh shows absolutely no sign of wanting to abdicate. I find him very cheerful, and I have no doubt he has the picture of Bahrein strongly in his mind at last, and hopes that we now, as he has asked for an Adviser, we will soon help him to achieve something like it, regardless of the fact that he himself has made it most difficult to do so. However if he did abdicate, I think Abdulla is about the only possible candidate. In the last few days of crisis he has had, in the customary Arab way, to fall back on and support the Subah family, and in consequence is not so popular as he was with the Council. I think generally speaking that he is fairly popular and fairly able. He is certainly extremely pleased with the C.I.E., and was the first, some weeks ago (see my D.O.No.C-220 of 24th June, 1938) to suggest a British Adviser, and I know that he agreed with and encouraged the Sheikh to ask for one the other day. He always says that he relies on us, and I believe that he would be better than Sheikh Ahmad in and with the Council, but this ofcourse is not saying much. p. 59

Returning again lastly to "the nature of "weightage" mentioned in your Para 2 I can only suggest the following:-

(a) Throwing the burden of proving their legitimacy on the Council. We could ask His Highness for any inaugural



-4-

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Returning again lastly to "the nature of "weightage" mentioned in your Para 2 I can only suggest the following:-

(a) Throwing the burden of proving their legitimacy on the Council. We could ask His Highness for any inaugural



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law, and in due course express perturbation at its loose drafting.

(The Council hanker after "recognition" by His Majesty's Government and are self conscious about the method of their "election").

(b) The Council (who are townsmen merchants) do not presumably wish Kuwait's relations with the British, the Bedouins, and Ibn Saud, to deteriorate but I feel sure they will, unless, as I have said above,

(1) Their function in the matter of Defence and (their) External Affaires is at the most only Advisory to the Sheikh (who naturally follows British advice).

Or alternatively

(2) Their function in matters of Defence and External affairs is (i.e.internally) executive, but that, for these two departments they have a British Adviser.

I think that an early solution one or the other of these lines is essential.

(c) Support the Sheikh by inviting him officially to London, as early as possible, not later than next spring.

(I believe the Oil Company also wish to entertain him there).

(d) Have you noticed India Office D.O.No.7459/36 of 29th October 1936 to Sir Trenchard Fowle in which it was suggested that the Resident should choose a favourable moment for discussing the question of foreign relations of Kuwait with the Sheikh of Kuwait. It is not necessarily "weightage", but you may like to note it in this connection. The fact that we are negotiating a new Agreement might be useful in putting off outside enquirers who hope to interfere for one reason or another and who will fasten on to the inaugural law.

(I have already been asked for a copy of the law by the American Consul, Baghdad. What do you wish me to reply?. It has appeared in Iraq press but I have not received a copy from the Sheikh.

Yours sincerely,

(Sgd.) G. S. de Gaury.





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AIR MAIL.

Confidential.

D.O.No.C/554 of 1938.

Office of the Political Resident
in the Persian Gulf,

Camp, Karachi.

Dated the 22nd August, 1938.

O/C
P.142 P.174

Will you please refer to the attached copies of de Gaury's telegrams No.266 and 267 of the 15th and 16th August 1938 on the subject of troubles at Kuwait.

2. I met de Gaury in Basrah on the 18th-19th August and discussed the whole problem fully with him. The comments and suggestions below represent our joint views.

3. The departure of the Secretary on indefinite leave removes the immediate cause of dissension, but does not, I fear, go far towards composing the essential differences between the Shaikh and his Council. In order that there may be no misapprehension on this point I should remark that de Gaury had himself suggested the leave solution in the early stages of the dispute, that the Shaikh at that time rejected the suggestion, and that the deciding factor, as he admitted to de Gaury, was that he had been informed that the Secretary would be stoned if he did not leave Kuwait before daylight on the 16th August. de Gaury has little doubt that if he personally had not made quite sure that the Secretary did in fact leave Kuwait before daybreak that morning there would have been serious disturbances; and he informs me that the Council did extremely well, in view of the bitterness ~~and~~ of public opinion, to prevent an earlier outbreak.

4. /

R. T. Peel Esquire, M.C.,
The India Office,
London.





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4. I am afraid that the use of the designation "Private Secretary" in early reports has tended to obscure the real issue. I myself read this to refer to Izzat Jaffar who had hitherto been described as the Private Secretary while the "Secretary" was the Persian Khan Bahadur Mulla Saleh. The latter's official title was changed on the creation of the Council. Neither person, however, could properly be regarded as merely a member of the Shaikh's personal entourage; both were directly concerned in the pre-existing administration; and indeed it is scarcely too much to say that Mulla Saleh was the Government. Thus this dispute was (and is), in actual fact, a struggle between the new and old forms of administration, and now that these two men have gone it must be our object to attempt to build up some sort of co-operation between the Shaikh and his Council. This is clearly a most difficult problem and personally I cannot altogether eliminate some feeling of regret that the Shaikh has now, according to de Gaury, completely put out of his mind any idea of abdication. (With the obvious successor, Shaikh Abdulla bin Salim, the problem would be infinitely simpler).

5. The situation then, in its essentials, remains unchanged. The Shaikh continues, in spite of de Gaury's frequent attempts, to lead him to a more reasonable point of view, to regard the Council as "the enemy". He displays not the least inclination to co-operate with them, and he expects, by his request for a British Adviser, to enlist the aid and support of His Majesty's Government against them. It is significant that he told de Gaury that he himself does not believe that the Council will willingly accept an Adviser.

de Gaury /





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de Gaury, too, is of the opinion, with which I entirely concur, that any approach to the Council on the question of an Adviser at this stage would be a serious error in tactics, for the Shaikh's move is so obviously designed, and will unquestionably be recognised in Kuwait, as an attempt to use the power of the British Government to break the Council. And incidentally de Gaury and I have little doubt that if he were to succeed he would lose no opportunity of shifting all the odium on to the shoulders of His Majesty's Government. On the other hand the Council, which after all is making some attempt to begin to introduce reforms into the administration, could at the best only regard our advocacy of such an appointment at the moment as a clear indication of mistrust of their motives and abilities. In such circumstances no Adviser could adequately carry out his functions, and public opinion, reacting to the Council's resentment, must become increasingly hostile to His Majesty's Government.

6. It seems to me therefore that our first step must be to disabuse both parties - and in particular the Shaikh - of any idea that we regard them as alternative and mutually repugnant manifestations of authority in Kuwait, or that we are likely to take sides in their disagreements. No progress can be made until the Shaikh realises that His Majesty's Government recognise the Council as an essential feature of the administration of Kuwait and, by implication, that they are not prepared to assist in any manoeuvres designed to destroy them. On their side the Council must understand that in spite of their "Inaugural Law" we regard

the /





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f.108 -4-

the Shaikh as the symbol of authority in Kuwait, and that, as Sir Trenchard Fowle remarked in paragraph 10 of his demi-official letter No.396-S of the 18th July 1938, the Shaikh is still officially responsible for Kuwait's relations with His Majesty's Goven ment. I propose therefore that the next step should be on the lines of paragraph 3 of Sir Trenchard Fowle's telegram No.275 of the 16th July 1938, where he suggested that a message should be sent to the Shaikh on behalf of His Majesty's Government, though in view of subsequent developments it is clearly necessary to revise the phrasing of the communication. The following is a rough idea of the kind of message I have in mind:

" I am directed by His Majesty's Government to inform Your Highness that they have learnt with satisfaction of your establishing a Council. I understand that in taking this step Your Highness has been actuated by a desire to associate the representatives of your people with your administration, and they trust that this admirable sentiment will be fully implemented in practice. They hope that there will be close and constant consultation between Your Highness and the members of your Council, and that your deliberations with them will be conducted in a spirit of mutual trust and confidence and will be distinguished by a sincere desire to advance the best interests of Kuwait by your co-operation."

" His Majesty's Government confidentially expect that the happy relations which have so long subsisted between themselves and the Ruler of Kuwait will be confirmed /





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"confirmed and strengthened; and in particular that there will be no disturbance of existing arrangements by which they undertake, in agreement with the Ruler, to conduct the foreign affairs of Kuwait. It is on this assumption that I am instructed to assure Your Highness of the continued intention of His Majesty's Government to preserve the integrity of Kuwait against external aggression."

7. This, it will be seen, blandly ignores the recent trouble since no particular object can be served by reviving unpleasant memories. I fully realise that the latter part of the suggested communication goes beyond the strict letter of our Treaty position, but it would be a pity to miss so excellent an opportunity of attaining the object set out in the correspondence leading up to your letter No.P.Z.7459/36 (D.134 p.159) of the 29th October 1936. I share de Gaury's opinion that His Highness is unlikely seriously to contest at such a juncture a written statement of what is, after all, the practical position.

8. It seems to me that it is of equal importance that some communication, whether written or verbal, be made to the members of the Council. The "Inaugural Law" arms them with greater authority in respect of external affairs and dealings with foreigners generally than we can comfortably acknowledge. The exact terms of this Law need not be taken too seriously, particularly since it has not been communicated officially to the Political Agent, but it is, I suggest, essential to remove from the minds of the Council any impression that we might regard them as the sole repository of authority in

Kuwait /





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-6-

Kuwait, that we should be prepared to deal with them to the exclusion of the Shaikh, or that we should tolerate their interference with foreign affairs or their assumption of sole authority in respect of the other matters recited in Article 3 of the Law. de Gaury has already thrown out a few hints to the members of the Council on these lines, and he informs me that they show no inclination to dispute his statement of the controlling power exercised by His Majesty's Government. At the present stage a formal pronouncement made with the authority of His Majesty's Government

(a) that we regard the Shaikh as the constitutional head of the State with whom our official relations will be maintained,

(b) repeating in general terms the advice to the Shaikh in regard to consultation and co-operation, and


(c) stating in unequivocal terms our insistence on control of foreign affairs and dealings with foreigners generally,

would excite no hostile reaction, and might well serve both to enhance the Shaikh's prestige and to create a more reasonable balance between him and the Council.

9. Action on the above lines will at least serve to clear the air and to remove misunderstanding, but if it is to produce effective results it is important that it should be taken without delay, before Iraqi intrigue and influence is brought to bear on the members of the Council.

10. To revert now to the Shaikh's formal request for a British Adviser. It seems to me that we can at the moment

only /





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-7-

only ignore this, and that de Gaury might be instructed to reply to any further enquiries from the Shaikh by saying that His Majesty's Government await the development of a fuller measure of co-operation between him and his Council and a clearer indication that the request represents a decision taken by "the Shaikh acting with his Council" before they take the matter into consideration. It is by no means improbable that the time will soon come when the Council will be ready to look much more favourably on such an appointment. The surprising unanimity which actuates them and the whole-hearted public support which they enjoy at present can scarcely last for ever, and as their difficulties increase so will their minds revert to the idea of a British Adviser - an idea which appealed so strongly to many of them in pre-Council days, before they themselves enjoyed the savour of authority. I doubt if it is necessary to argue the advantages of introducing a British Adviser sooner or later, and if this is accepted in principle it will no doubt be possible for de Gaury, as time goes on, to help the idea take fresh root in the minds of the Council.

11. I am afraid this letter is very long and contains little that is immediately constructive, but it seems to me that constructive development cannot occur until our own position is understood quite clearly and until the Shaikh in particular realises that we cannot be lured into participation in his schemes to destroy the Council. It is this thought which has been most prominently in my mind during the last ten days.

12. /



192

-8-

12. I am sending copies* of this letter to Sir Aubrey Metcalfe and to de Gaury.

o/c. L

* sent under Printed letter No.C/555 dated the 22nd August 1938.



193

45/23

Air Mail.

Confidential.

D.O.No.C/556.

Office of the Political Resident in
the Persian Gulf,
Camp, Karachi.
Dated the 22nd August, 1938.

O/C

I want to thank you very much indeed for arranging for 84 Squadron to fly me back from Basrah to Bahrain on Friday last. It saved rather an awkward dislocation of the work of the Residency.

2. The dispute between the Shaikh and his Council at Kuwait has been settled temporarily (I trust, but cannot be certain, that it will not recur). I have therefore asked de Gaury to arrange direct with Shaibah for the return of the mobile wireless set which you so kindly lent us, and I hope that this will have been done by now.

3. With grateful thanks for your assistance.

Yours sincerely,

O/C

Air Vice Marshal C.L.Courtney, CB.,CBE.,DSO.,
Air Officer Commanding,
British Forces in Iraq,
Habbaniya.



194
191

45/23

By Air Mail.

P.Z. 5661/ 1938.

BUSHIRE RESIDENCY.
No. Karachi
Date 30.8.38
CONFIDENTIAL RECORDS

INDIA OFFICE,
LONDON,
26 AUG 1938

Forwarded with the compliments of the Secretary, Political Department, India Office.

51

A copy has been sent to India + Koweit.

by Air/Sea Mail.

I.S.C.

~~The Foreign Secretary, Government of India.~~
The Political Resident in the Persian Gulf.

4963 2000 7.36



195

INDIA OFFICE,
WHITEHALL, S.W.1.
6th August, 1938.

P.Z.5309/38

Immediate.

p.116

Would you please refer to Bagdad telegram No.60-Saving dated the 19th July (Foreign Office Ref. E.4374/1642/91) about the Iraqi interest in the newly established Council in Koweit?

We have sent you, under cover of India Office letter No.P.Z.5309/38 of the 28th July, a copy of Bushire telegram No.297 of the 27th July in which Fowle suggests the lines of a statement to the Iraqi Foreign Minister. Copy is now enclosed of Fowle's letter of 18th July reporting the sequence of events at Koweit. You will see that he sent a copy of it to Peterson.

p.118
p.108
p.106

In his earlier telegram No.275 of the 16th July (see India Office letter No.P.Z.5035/38 of the 18th July) Fowle suggested the terms of a message which he might be authorised to send to the Sheikh on behalf of His Majesty's Government with reference to the new Council. We deferred action on this pending receipt/

C.W. Baxter, Esq.,
Foreign Office,
S. W. 1.



196

2.

receipt of the report which Fowle had promised by post. This has now been received and throws light on the surprising development by which the Council has obtained so much control of the administration.

In the light of the report, and after consultation with Sir T. Fowle, who passed through London on 5th August, we would now propose, if the Foreign Office agree, that the terms of the message to the Sheikh proposed in Bushire telegram No. 275 of 16th July should be slightly modified as follows:- f.106

"I am directed by His Majesty's Government to inform Your Highness that they have noted with interest Your Highness's decision to establish a Council in Koweit. His Majesty's Government trust that this step will lead to the increased prosperity of Koweit. They look forward with confidence to a continuance in the future, as in the past, of the happy relations between the Ruler of Koweit and His Majesty's Government." f.116

As regards Peterson's telegram No. 60 of 19th July, we suggest that he should be authorised to reply to the Iraqi Foreign Minister on the lines

suggested/



197

3.

suggested in paragraph 3 of Bushire telegram of 27th July, No.297, with the omission of any reference to the powers of the Council having been published in the Iraqi press. The "Law" stating the Council's powers is enclosed with Fowle's letter of 18th July, so that Peterson will have it for his own information. We think, and Fowle agrees, that his reply to the Iraqi Government should not enter into details about these powers, which may in practice be considerably less than one might suppose from a reading of the document; in particular, for example, we understand that the Sheikh's assent will still be necessary for all legislative and executive acts.

(Sgd.) R. PEEL.



198

P.Z.5648/38

FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W.1.

4660/1642/91)

10th August, 1938.

f.195

My dear Peel,

With reference to your letter P.Z.5309/38 of the 6th August to Baxter, who is on leave, I write to say that we agree with the terms of the modified message which it is proposed to address to the Sheikh of Koweit on the establishment of the Administrative Council.

2. As regards the suggested reply to Bagdad, we feel that it might be a mistake not to give the Iraqi Minister for Foreign Affairs a copy of the law governing the powers of the Council, if he should wish to have one. If the powers have already been correctly published in the Iraqi press, there can be no harm in giving a copy by way of confirmation; if they have been incorrectly published, it would be as well to let the Minister for Foreign Affairs have the authentic version. If therefore you have no objection, we will add a paragraph to our telegram to Houstoun-Boswall, saying that he may give a copy of the law to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, should the latter ask for one.

Yours ever,

(Sd.) LACY BAGGALLAY

R.T. Peel, Esq., M.C.



Pol Res.

199

P.Z.5661/38

INDIA OFFICE,
WHITEHALL, S.W.1.
24th August, 1938.

My dear Baggallay,

p.198


Would you kindly refer to paragraph 2 of your letter of the 10th August (No.E.4660/1642/91) regarding the nature of the reply to be made to the Iraqi Foreign Minister's enquiry concerning the powers of the newly formed Koweit Council?

2. We have no objection to a paragraph being added to the telegram to Bagdad on the lines proposed but suggest that if at their request a copy of the Law is given to the Iraqis it would be desirable, at the same time, to give them the explanation at the end of my letter of the 6th — p.195 August.

3. In view of the developments referred to in the correspondence ending with our telegram to the Resident No.1450 of — p.162 the 14th August (copy of which was sent to the Foreign Office with India Office Printed Letter No.P.Z.5661/38 of the 15th August) we have not pursued the question of sending a message to the Sheikh about the establishment of the Administrative Council.

4. I regret that owing to an oversight we have delayed/

L. Baggallay, Esq.,
Foreign Office,
S. W. 1.



200

2.

delayed replying to your letter.

Yours sincerely,

(Sgd.) R. PEEL.

45/23

201

Confidential.

Office of the Political Resident
in the Persian Gulf,
Camp, Karachi.

D.O.No.C/591.

Dated the 31st August, 1938.

O/C

P.197 Will you please refer to the last sentence of Peel's letter No. P.Z.5309/38, dated the 6th August 1938, to Baxter (a copy of which has been forwarded to you under cover of India Office Printed Letter No. P.Z.5661/38, dated the 26th August 1938), regarding the powers of the Kuwait Council. P.194

2. Peel's letter was written before the occurrence of the recent crisis, but that affair did not of course alter the constitutional position in Kuwait resulting from the Shaikh's acceptance of the "Law" defining the powers of the Council. P.103 I have not been able to find in Sir Trenchard Fowle's report of 18th July, P.108 or in any of your reports prior or subsequent to it, any statement justifying the assumption in Peel's letter, and as it is a matter of importance that His Majesty's Government should be under no misapprehension regarding the actual constitutional position in Kuwait, I would be glad if you would let me have your views as to the correctness or otherwise of Peel's assumption.

O/C

Captain G.S.de Gaury, M.C.,
Political Agent,
Kuwait.



45/23

202

Confidential.

D.O.No.C- 271

Political Agency,

Kuwait.

Dated the 23rd August, 1938.

52

My dear Weightman,

As part of the Political reconstruction here it has been decided by the Sheikh that Sheikh Abdulla Salim is to be inspector of the Subah estates, and the accounts in this connection. He proposes to appoint an efficient English speaking clerk who has already been selected and I hope that there will be a noticeable improvement as a result.

Yours sincerely


[signature]

H.Weightman Esquire,I.C.S.,
Officiating Political Resident
in the Persian Gulf, At Karachi.

(Copy under P.L. C/594 d.2.9.38
to S. O. & G. of India)

Copy of above P.L.
to Kuwait.

[initials] 2/9.



Confidential.

D.O.No.C- 271

Political Agency,

Kuwait.

Dated the 23rd August, 1938.

My dear Weightman,

As part of the Political reconstruction here it has been decided by the Shaikh that Shaikh Abdulla Salim is to be Inspector of the Subah estates, and the accounts in this connection. He proposes to appoint an efficient English speaking clerk who has already been selected and I hope that there will be a noticeable improvement as a result.

Yours sincerely
[signature]

H.Weightman Esquire, I.C.S.,

Officiating Political Resident

in the Persian Gulf, At Karachi.

(Copy under P.L. C/584 d. 2.9.38
to G. of I. E.A. Dept.)
Copy placed P.L.
to Kuwait



45/23 203

By Air Mail.

P.Z. 6091/ 1938.

INDIA OFFICE,
LONDON,
6 SEP 1938

13/9


BUSHIRE RESIDENCY.
No. Bahrain
Date. 14.9.38.
CONFIDENTIAL RECORDS

Forwarded with the compliments of the Secretary, Political Department, India Office.

A copy has been sent to India + Koweit.
by ~~Sea~~ Air Mail.

~~The Foreign Secretary, Government of India.~~
The Political Resident in the Persian Gulf.

4963 2000 7.36



ENCLOSURE IN FOREIGN OFFICE
COVERING LETTER DATED 30 AUG 1938

P.Z.
6091
1938

204

5004/1642/91.)

NO DISTRIBUTION.

Code telegram to Mr. Houstoun-Boswall (Bagdad).

Foreign Office. 29th August, 1938. 9.20 p.m.


No. 114. (R).

:::::::::::

My telegram No. 106 [of July 30th: establishment of administrative Council for Koweit].

You may inform Acting Iraqi Minister for Foreign Affairs that Sheikh of Koweit has, in conformity with public opinion, established a Council to assist him in the administration of his State and that His Majesty's Government expect that this step will lead to the increasing prosperity of Koweit. The formation of this Council, however, in no way affects the relations between the Sheikh and His Majesty's Government, who still consider him responsible for Koweit's relations with themselves.

2. You may also, if the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs asks for it, give him a copy of the law governing the powers of the Council, which was enclosed in Sir T. Fowle's demi-official letter No. 396-S of the 18th July to the India Office. You should in that event explain orally that powers of the Council may be less in practice than may appear from this document as the Sheikh's assent will still be necessary for all legislative and executive acts.



53/83 + 45/23

205

(128/12/38)

British Embassy,

Baghdad.

14th September, 1938.

Air Mail.

My dear Baggalay,

My despatches Nos. 437 and 447 of 7th and 10th September about Koweit.

The Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs may have given some indication of at least one strong motive for Iraqi interest in Koweit when he asked me yesterday if it was true that of a population of about 50,000 some 20,000 were Iranians and whether the latter had objected to the Shaikh's new Council.

I said that I could not answer him off hand, but having looked things up I told him, when I happened to see him this morning, that I found that there were about 20,000 Iranians in Koweit and that it was true that a certain amount of absolutely insincere agitation against the Council had been got up amongst some of them by a certain disgruntled official.

As you well know, these people are terrified of Iran and view with the utmost concern any signs of Iranian penetration on the Arabian side of the Gulf.

As he had brought up Koweit, I told him that on my return from seeing him last week, I had had a good look at the map and had made a few informal inquiries on my own about smuggling. It seemed to me, from study of the map and from talking to people who had been down there, that the prevention of smuggling through Al Batin, where whole armies could hide, was

an/-

206

2.

an almost superhuman task. He had suggested that the Shaikh himself might be implicated. My very superficial enquiries had led me to wonder whether the Iraqi authorities in the southern towns could be entirely above suspicion either. How else could the smugglers, who appeared to move about in very large convoys, dispose of their contraband with impunity and to such an extent ?

I do not want to detract from my despatch; but I felt it would do no harm to give the Minister something to think about, too.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Bushire and Koweit.

Yours ever,

sd/- W.E.Houstoun-Boswall



207

45/23

1 - 1. Kuwait X.L. No. C/150, d. 4/4/38.

P.R.

Copy may be forwarded to I.O. & G. of I. in continuation of our X.L. No. C/149, d. 22/3/38.?

[initials] 11.4.

[initials] 11/4/38

Issued P.L. No. C/238 d. 11.4.38. to I.O. and G. of I.

[initials] 11/4.

- 2. India Office telegram No. 743 d: 15.4.38.

P.R.

I.O. should receive today our P.L. No. C/238, d. 11.4.38, reporting the article in the Basrah newspaper "as Sejil".

Draft telegram to P.A., Kuwait submitted.

[initials] 16.4.38.

[initials] 16/4

4. Issued telegram No. T/102 dated 16.4.38 to Kuwait

tel. 16/4



45/23

Kuwait telegram No 163 dated 18.4.38 — 3. p.5

PR

Draft telegram to I.O. submitted

[signature] 19/4.

[signature] 19/4/38

Issued telegram No T/103 dated 18.4.38 to S/S, India. — p.6.

Issued P.L. No C/252 dated 18/4/38 to Govt of India + P.A. Kuwait. [initials] 18/4

[signature] 19.4.

~~Bahrain. Lo letter No P.Z.2447/38 d. 11/4/38.~~

Kuwait P.L. No. C-162 d. 14/4/38. — 4 p.7

PR.

Copy under P.L. to I.O. and India in continuation of our tel. No. T/103, d. 18.4.38.? — p.6

[signature] 20.4.

[signature] 21/4

Issued P.L. No. C/265, d. 21/4/38 to I.O. & G. of I. [initials] 21/4.

Kuwait P.L. No. C. 164, d. 19/4/38 — 5. p.11

Copy to I.O. & G. of I. ?

[initials] 23/4.


PR.

Also to Baghdad ?

Para 2 of P.L. — "P.A., K. reports that H.H. the Shaikh has issued a denial of the statements in the Article"?

[signature] 23.4.38.

[signature] 23/4



208

45/23

p. 13 Issued P.L. No. C/268, d. 23/4/38 to I.O. G.of I and Baghdad.
23/4

PR.
p. 14 - Your note of 25th April on the Kuwait agitation is submitted below.
We have not received copy of Mr. Symon's note of 21st April and yours of 14th April referred to in para 1 thereof
12.5.38

By PR's order,
d.o. below to issue 12/5

17 - Issued d.o. No. 234-S d. 12/5/38 to Mr. Gibson. Sir A. Metcalfe etc.
Issued - P.L. No. 237-S
12/5.

18 - 6. Baghdad P.L. No. 128/4/38 d. 28/4/38
PR Copy to Govt. of I.?
11.6/5

16.5

U.S.
yes. In continuation of my letter at p. 17
16/5

Issued P.L. No. 253-S d. 17.5.38 to G. of I.
17/5.

F. [illegible]



45/23.

Tel No. 986, d. 24.5.38 from S/S for I. 7 – 22

P.R.

Para 2 G. of I. views may be awaited?

Para 3 P.A. may be instructed to prepare this?

[initials] 25.5.

Issue memo below to P.A. Kt.

[initials] 25/5

Issued Memo: No. 287-S d. 25.5.38 to Kuwait – 23.

[initials] 25/5

G. of India Tel. No. 869 d. 26.5.38 8. – 24

P.R.

P.A., Kuwait, can now be instructed (unless you wish to take action personally) to make to the Shaikh on your behalf, oral representations on the terms ~~on the lines~~ of para 4 of your note of 25th April? 1.14

[initials] 27.5.38

By PR's Order,

X. L. below to issue to P.A. Kuwait

[initials] 27.5.

Issued X. L. No. 297-S. d. 27/5/38 to P.A. Kuwait. – 25.

[initials] 27/5



210
209

26- 9. Kuwait P.L. N: C/190 d: 23.5.38
31- 10. " " · C/194 · 27.5.38

Copy to India office, Govt: of India + Baghdad quoting P.A's remark in para 2 of S.N.O. (10).

30/5

PR. It does not appear necessary to send any other than that at p. 29.

30/5

U.S. That on p. 29

1/5

Issued P.L. No. 318-S d. 2.6.38 to I.O., G. of I. & Baghdad.

4/6

35- 11. India Office D.O. No. P.Z. 3548/38, d. 27/5/38.

PR File ?

6/6

6/6

p37 12 I.O. P.L. to P.Z. 2962/38, d. 14.5.38
p42 13. Kuwait letter No. C-212, d 13/6/38.

PR Submitted for discussion with P.A., Kuwait.

16/6.

By PR's orders, for issue. Letter to Sh. of Kuwait. XL. to I.O. etc.

17/6.

p45 p47 Issued letter No. C/332, d. 18/6/38 to Sh. of Kt. XL. No. C/334, to I.O. etc.

18/6



Issued P.L. No. C/348 d. 20.6.38 to P.O., P.A. etc. 49

20/6

Kuwait P.L. dated 18.6.38. 14-51

Issued P.L. C/379 d. 27.6.38 to P.O., P.A. & Baghdad.

Kuwait D.O. No. 219, d. 24/6/38. 15.-55

——— 220 ——— 16.-59

——— 221 d. 25/6/38 17.-62

——— P.L. No. 222 d. 24/6/38 18.-65

——— D.O. No. 229. d 29/6/38 19.-69

——— X.L. No. C. 235 d. 6/7/38 20.-70

——— Memo. No. C. 238 d. 7/7/38 21.-77

——— Tel. No. 230, d. 11/7/38. 22.-100

——— D.O. No. C. 246, d. 12/7/38 23.-101

PR

14.7.

By PR's order,

15-19. File.

Telegram below for issue to P.O.

20-22. Resubmit on 15/7.

14/7.

Issued telegram N: 269 d: 14.7.38 to Iraq office. - 105

Issued P.L. N= 379-S d. 14.7.38 to P.A. etc

14/7

By P.R's order:

Issued d.o. No. 396-S d. 18/7/38 to Mr. Peel. -108

——— P.L. No. 397-S ——— G. of I etc.

18/7.



210

By P.R's order.

106 - Issued tel. No. 275. d. 16/7/38 to I.O.
——— P.L. No. 392-S ——— to G. of I.
——— 397-S ——— to Bagdad.

116 - 24. Bagdad No. 3. Saving. d. 19/7/38.

PR.
Copy of your report at p. 108 has gone to Ambassador by last week's bag. File?
25/7.

25/7


117 - 25 India office tel: N: 1326 d: 26.7.38

PR.
Your report should reach Baghdad as well as I.O. (to whom it was sent via Bahrain) tomorrow by air mail via Bahrain.
27/7.

C.A.
Issue Tel: below to I.O.
27/7.

118 - Issued tel. No. 297. d. 27/7/38 to India Office.
——— P.L. No. 476-S ——— Govt. of India.
27/7

By PR's order,
pue 21 (p. 77) to be sent to I.O. and India under P.L.
ref. PR's letter at p. 108.
Issued P.L. No. 481-S d: 28.7.38 to India office, India
28/7



45/23.

By P.R's orders:

Issued Memo No. 480-S. d. 28/7/38 to Kuwait. - 119.

27.

PR.

Submitted for perusal, Sir T. Fowle's report of 18th July on the recent agitation in Kuwait. f108

[signature] 4.8.38

Thanks
[initials]
4/8

Kuwait telegram No 255, d. 9-8-38 26. f122

PR.

The only sloop in the Gulf at present is the "Deptford", at Bahrain, where she is due to stay until the 23rd.

If necessary A.O.C. can be asked to send mobile wireless unit from Sharjah.

Shaikh Abdulla bin Salim, the Shaikh's cousin, is the President of the Council.

28.

We should get PA's second report any time now.

[signature] 10.8.38.

By PR's order issued.

Message d. 10-8-38 to O.C. Deptford. f124

Tel. No T/190 d ——— P.A. Kuwait f125

——— T/191 ——— A.O.C. Habbaniyah f126

f127

[signature] 10/8.



211

27. Signal d. 10.8.38 from O.C. "Deptford"

PR

[initials] 10/8.

Please 'phone reply as follows.

I hope to have fuller information by tomorrow morning at latest and will inform you at once.

[initials]
10/8

Phoned at 12-30.

[initials]
10/8.

28. Kuwait tel: No. 257 d. 10/8/38

PR.
The immediately preceding telegram referred to has not yet been received and Telegraphs say there is nothing else so far. It is possible that the reference is wrong and No 255 is meant.

[initials] 10/8.

p.122



45/23.

Issued tel. No. T/192 d. d. 10. 8. 38. | 130

10/8.

Kuwait tel: N: 258 d: 10. 8. 38. | 29 | 131

PR.

11/8.

Kuwait tel: unnumbered d: 10. 8. 38 | 30 | 132

Filed by order

11/8

Issued tel. no. T/193, d. 11. 8. 38 to SNO. — 13

Kuwait telegram no 259. d. 11. 8. 38 | 31 | — 13

260 | 32. | — 13

Issued tel. no. T/194, d. 11. 8. 38. to P.O.Ch. — 137

T/195. Kuwait tel. — 13

11/8.

Issued I.L. N: C/538 d: 11. 8. 38 to Kuwait

11/8



212

45/23.

141 33. Kuwait tel. No. 261 d. 11.8.38.

142 34 A.H.Q.(Iraq) tel. No. 0625 d. 11.8.38.

143 35. S.N.O's tel. d. 11.8.38.

144 Issued tel: N: 196 to Kuwait d: 12 8 38

145 " N: 197 to A.O.C. d. - - -

36 S.N.O's tel: N: 0437/2 d: 12.8.38.

P.R.

37. India Office tel. No. 1441, d. 12/8/38. [initials] 12/8

149 - 38. Basrah tel. No. NIL. d. 12/8/38.

150 - 39. Kuwait tel. No. 262, d. 12/8/38.

151 - Issued tel. No. T/198. d. 13/8/38 to Basrah.

152 40. A.H.Q. Iraq's tel: N: Z/468 a d: 12/8/38

P.R.

The 'plane is not staying at Kuwait.
[initials] 13/8/38

[initials] 13/8



45/23.

Kuwait tel. No. 264 d. 13/8/38.

41. p. 153

P.R.

In his telegram no. 255 d. 9.8.38 p/122 P.A. Kuwait describes the individual as "Private Secretary," who, according to his Report of 7th July on the Administration of Kuwait (see p. 79 2nd para) was the Syrian (Izzet Jaafar).

[signature] 13/8.

Seen by P.R.

P.R.

Copy may be forwarded to G of I. by air mail?

[signature] 13/8.

Yes. With explanation as above.

[initial] 13/8

Issued P.L. No. C/541 d. 13.8.38 to G. of India
—— tel. No. T/199 —— to S.N.O. + A.O.C.

[initial] 13/8.



45/23

213

137 42 S.NO's tel: N: 0904 d: 13.8.38.

PR

p155 This crossed your tel. No. T/199 of yesterday

[illegible] 14/8

43 Kuwait tel. No. 1420 d. 13.8.38.

159 By P.R's orders issued tel. No. T/201 d. 14.8.38 to S.N.O. etc.

160 — " — Tel. No. T/202 d. 14.8.38 to S.N.O.

161 — " — T/203 —

[illegible] 14/8.

p162 44. I.O. tel. No. 1450, d. 14.8.38.

By PR's order, issued.

164 D/O Tel. No. T/204, d. 15.8.38. to P.A.K.

165 — letter — C/545 —

169 Tel — T/205; — Consul Basrah

170 45. SNO's tel. No. 0448, d. 15.7.16.8.38.

By PR's order,

170 issued tel. No T/207, d. 15.8.38 to SNO. repeated Deptford

[illegible] 15/8.

171 46. Kuwait tel. No. P.A.3, d. 15.8.38.

PR.

171 On page 46 I issued tel. T/206 d. 15.8.38 typed below it.

[illegible] 15/8.

[illegible] 16/8



45/23.

Kuwait tel. no. 266, d. 15.8.38 46. 172

By PR's order issued

Tel no. T/208. d. 16-8.38. to SNO etc. } 173

——— T/209 ——————— P.A., Kuwait }

16/8.

Kuwait Tel. no. 267, d. 16-8.38 47, 174

PR.

File?

16/8

Kuwait tel. no. 268, d. 16.8.38. 175 48.

Issued tel. no. T/214, d 18.8.38 to PA etc. 176

Kuwait P.L. No. C-263 d. 15/8/38. 49. 177

——— d.o. C-265 d. 17/8/38. 50. 180

185

Issued d.o. letter No. C/554 of 22/8/38 to India Office. 192

——— " P.L. " C/555 ——— G.of I. & Kt.

——— letter No. C/556 to G.o.C. 193

India Office P.L. No. P.Z. 5661/38. d. 26/8/38 51. - 194

P.R.

File?

31/8

31/8.

Draft. d.o. letter to Capt de Gaury submitted. 31/8!

31/8

214

45/23

201- Issued d.o. letter No. C/591 d. 31/8/38 to Capt. de Gaury, Kuwait.

202 53. Kuwait D.O. No. C-271, d. 23/8/38.

PR. Copy under P.L. to I.O. & Govt.?
21/9.

1/9/38

Issued P.L. No. C/594 d. 2.9.38 to I.O. & G.o.I.
2/9.

53 I.O. P.L. P.Z. 6091/38 d. 6.9.38.

PR.
Ref. last sentence of enclosure, we await reply from Capt. de Gaury to your d.o. letter of 31st August
p. 201.
File?
21/9.

14/9